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The 1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa
1
 (hereinafter the "OAU Convention") is, to date, the only legally binding 
regional refugee treaty.  In 1994, a symposium of the OAU member states 
reaffirmed 'its belief in the continuing validity of the 1969 OAU Convention as the 
cornerstone of refugee protection in Africa,’
2
 thereby confirming its significance. 
The OAU Convention's genesis stemmed from the 1951 UN Refugee Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees'
3
 (hereinafter the "1951 Convention") limited use 
for dealing with the specific refugee situation in Africa.  Its most celebrated feature 
has been its expansion of the refugee definition to include those persons who are 
not only fleeing from individualized persecution, rather those who are also fleeing 
from 'external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously 
disturbing public order in a part or a whole'
4
 of their country. 
 
South Africa's refugee protection system is still in its nascent stage of development, 
as it commenced only after the demise of Apartheid regime in the early 1990s.  In 
1995 and 1996 South Africa signed the OAU Convention and the1951 Convention, 
respectively.  Shortly thereafter, South Africa enacted its Refugees Act 130 of 1998, 
which became operational in the year 2000.  The Refugees Act incorporates both 
the 1951 Convention and OAU refugee definitions, thus providing for expanded 
refugee protection in the Republic.   
 
The OAU refugee definition and the OAU Convention as a whole has not been 
subject to much interrogation, neither has it been the subject of much international 
jurisprudence.  In comparison with the amount of soft law, case law and academic 
literature which has developed around the 1951 Refugee Convention, its refugee 
                                               
1
 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa Adopted on 
10 September 1969 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, CAB/LEG/24.3., entered 
into force on 20 June 1974 (hereinafter the "'OAU Convention") 
2
 The Addis Ababa Document on Refugees and Forced Population Displacements in Africa Adopted 
by the OAU/UNHCR Symposium on Refugees and Forced Population Displacements in Africa 8-10 
September 1994 Addis Ababa at par 3. 
3
 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, entered into force April 22, 
1954 and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, entered into force on 4 
October 1967 (hereinafter the "1951 Convention") 




definition and its legal principles, there is little of same in terms of the OAU 
Convention to the extent that '...today, domestic law is really the only theatre 




The above can unquestionably be said as well of South Africa's analysis of the 
OAU refugee definition. To date, there exist no published Refugee Appeal Board 
decisions, or reported or unreported South African High Court decisions that have 
interpreted the OAU refugee definition.  In general, refugee law jurisprudence in 
South Africa is thin, save for a number of mainly asylum procedure-related cases.   
Moreover, reliable statistics from the South African Department of Home Affairs or 
other sources, which may detail the extent or degree of the application of the OAU 
refugee definition in South Africa refugee practice, are not readily available, if non-
existent.   
 
In analyzing the various elements of the OAU refugee definition as well as the 
approach to refugee determination in the country, the researcher will attempt to 
ascertain whether in the South African context, this expanded refugee definition is 
providing the necessary protection to certain individuals, as envisaged by the OAU 
Convention.  A detailed analysis of selected Refugee Appeal Board decisions on 
topic will assist in determining the current level of protection afforded by the South 
African refugee regime in this regard.   
 
As background, it is relevant to note that the researcher's objectives, in terms of her 
intended research methodology,
6
 were not met with complete success.  In this 
regard, the researcher initially set out to obtain a wide sampling of South African 
Refugee Appeal Board decisions, however, despite repeated attempts at securing 
                                               
5 G Okoth Obbo 'Thirty Years On: A Legal Review of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa' in Refugee Survey Quarterly Vol 20 
No 1 2001 79 at 105 
6
 Due to the requirement of brevity, a detailed methodology section has not been included in this 
paper.  It was intended, according to the original research proposal that 'the researcher review a 
number of selected Refugee Appeal Board decisions to determine the standard of protection afforded 
in South Africa in terms of the OAU refugee definition.  If permitting, the researcher will conduct 
semi-structured interviews with Refugee Appeal Board judges and possibly Refugee Status 
Determination Officers of the Department of Home Affairs, Refugee Affairs.... Where possible, the 
author will also review Home Affairs and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) statistics, and examine statements and actions of government officials to ascertain the 





same, was only able to review a small number of Appeal Board decisions to review. 
While it may be assumed that Appeal Board's interpretation and application of the 
OAU definition is consistent in all of its decisions, without having reviewed a larger 
number of decisions, this conclusion cannot be made with certainty.  A similar lack 
of success in obtaining relevant statistics from the South African Department of 
Home Affairs was a further challenge to the intended comprehensive review of this 
subject matter.  Lastly, due to the scope of this research, structured interviews with 
government officials were also not conducted.  Despite the above, the researcher 
has thoroughly reviewed all other sources and materials relevant to the subject and 
the following dissertation provides an in-depth analysis of South Africa's 
interpretation of the OAU refugee definition and its method of application of same.   
 
This paper will begin by providing background information on the development of 
the OAU Convention and its expanded refugee definition. This will include a brief 
comparison of the OAU refugee definition to that of the 1951 refugee definition and 
an evaluation of whether the OAU definition provides for prima-facie or group 
refugee determination.  The paper will then scrutinize the OAU refugee definition, 
by analyzing each element of the definition in order to better comprehend its 
meaning and how it should be applied accordingly.  Thereafter, the paper will focus 
on South Africa's legal position vis a vis the OAU refugee definition.  This will 
include a review of South Africa's refugee protection history, an examination of the 
way in which the OAU refugee definition is seemingly applied by first instance 
decision-makers in the asylum process, and a review of the Refugee Appeal Board's 
interpretation of the OAU definition.  Finally, an academic discussion of the 
potential application of the OAU definition to the current situation of Zimbabwean 
forced migrants will be undertaken before the paper concludes, with its overall 
analysis of how South Africa is applying the OAU refugee definition and whether 
or not it is adhering to the provisions of the OAU Convention.  
 
II. The OAU Convention and its Expanded Refugee Definition  
 
Nearly forty years on, the OAU refugee definition remains an essential means of 
providing protection to large numbers of persons who are forced to flee their 




generalized violence.  This part of the paper will review the notion of the expanded 
definition in refugee law.  In this regard, it will briefly examine the 1951 refugee 
definition with a purpose of providing a comparative backdrop to the OAU refugee 
definition, and thereafter examine the motivations for the development of the OAU 
refugee definition, the complementary character of the OAU definition and some of 
the salient and innovative aspects of the definition.  
 
(i) As compared to the 1951 refugee definition 
 
The 1951 Convention definition of a refugee is still the primary standard of refugee 
status today.  It states the following:  
 
'For the purposes of the present Convention, the term 
"refugee,, shall apply to any person who….as a result of 
events occurring before I January 1951 and owing to 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a 
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 




The 1951 Convention refugee definition limited the scope of mandatory 
international protection to refugees who were forced to flee due to a pre-1951 event 
that occurred within Europe.  Despite the removal of these temporal and 
geographical limitations, which was achieved by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees
8
, the 1951 refugee definition still means that 'most Third World 
refugees remain de facto excluded, as their flight is more often prompted by natural 
disaster, war or broadly based political and economic turmoil than by persecution… 
                                               
7
 Art 1(A)(2), 1951 Convention  
8
 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 606 U.N.T.S. 8791, entered into force on 4 
October 1967 at Articles 1(2) and (3) states, respectively, that '…for the purpose of the present 
Protocol, the term "refugee" shall, except as regards the application of paragraph 3 of this article, 
mean any person within the definition of article I of the Convention as if the words "As a result of 
events occurring before 1 January 1951...' and the words '...as a result of such events', in article 
1A(2) were omitted…' and '…the present Protocol shall be applied by the States Parties hereto 
without any geographic limitation, save that existing declarations made by States already Parties to 
the Convention in accordance with article I B (I) (a) of the Convention, shall, unless extended under 




[since while] these phenomena undoubtedly may give rise to genuine fear and 
hence the need to seek safe haven from one’s home, refugees whose flight is not 
motivated by persecution rooted in civil or political status are excluded from the 




In examining the 1951 Convention definition as contrasted to the OAU definition, it 
is relevant to recognize the reasoning or motivations behind the original refugee 
definition.   According to James Hathaway, 'the strategic dimension of the [1951 
refugee] definition was derived from successful efforts of Western states to give 
priority in protection matters to persons whose flight was motivated by pro-Western 
political values.'
10
   In this regard, the 1951 refugee definition suggests that the bond 
of protection between citizen and state has been severed
11
 – either because the state 
is the persecutor or the state is unable or unwilling to provide protection to the 
individual who is being or may be persecuted by another agent of persecution.  
Furthermore, the 1951 refugee definition contains a 'quality of deliberateness'
12
 
since an asylum seeker must prove that he or she faces persecution as a result of 
being specifically targeted due to one of the enumerated grounds, being either race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.  
This aspect of deliberate targeting of an individual on the part of the agent of 
persecution supports the individualistic nature of or the subjective concept of a 
refugee according to the 1951 definition. 
 
According to the 1951 definition, which 'was carefully phrased to include only 
persons who have been disenfranchised by their state on the basis of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion,'
13
 persons 
are provided protection if they are the victims of civil or political oppression.  On 
                                               
9
 JC Hathaway The Law of Refugee Status (1991) at 10-11 
10
 Ibid at 6 
11
 A Shacknove 'Who is a Refugee? in Ethics (January 1995) Vol 95 No 2 274 at 275 confirms that 
the theoretical basis for the refugee definition is 'predicated on an implicit argument (or conception) 
that a) a bond of trust, loyalty, protection, and assistance between the citizen and the state constitutes 
the normal basis of society; b) in the case of the refugee, this bond has been severed; c) persecution 
and alienage are always the physical manifestations of this severed bon; and d) these manifestations 
are the necessary and sufficient conditions for determining refugeehood.' 
12
 M Rankin 'Extending the limits or narrowing the scope? Deconstructing the OAU refugee 
definition thirty years on' UNHCR Working Paper No. 113 (April 2005) accessed at 
http://www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/425f71a42.pdf on 2 January 2008 at 7 




the other hand, socio-economic rights are not protected in that those persons who 
are 'denied even such basic rights as food, health care, or education, are excluded 





(ii) A ground-breaking regional complement 
 
The Preamble to the OAU Convention states that the Convention '...shall be the 
effective regional complement in Africa of the 1951 United Nations Convention on 
the Status of Refugees.'
15
   In addition to being considered as supplementary to the 
1951 Convention, the OAU Convention and especially its expanded definition of 
refugee is considered a landmark in refugee law.
16
    
 
The adoption of the OAU Convention reflected 'more closely the realities of Africa 
during a period of violent struggle for self-determination and national 
development'
17
 and the need to develop a refugee regime that would provide 
protection to the type of forced migrants that are found on the continent.
 
 While this 
conclusion is likely correct, it is important to keep in mind the fact, as George 
Okoth-Obbo fervently states, that academic and legal analysis of the meaning or 
intentions of the OAU Convention drafters is seriously challenged due to the 
'frustrating dearth of publicly available original records on the Convention.'
18
   In 
this regard, in his seminal work Thirty Years On: A Legal Review of the 1969 OAU 
Refugee Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 
Okoth-Obbo based on his thorough review of available sources, concludes that in 
fact the 'motive forces of the [OAU] Convention were essentially political, and then 
particularly security-driven, even if the animation was to be caste [sic] and 
                                               
14
 Ibid  
15
 OAU Convention, Preamble 
16
 EO Awuku 'Refugee Movements in Africa and the OAU Convention on Refugees' in Journal of 
African Law Vol 39 No 1 (1995) 79 at 86 
17
 E Arboleda 'Refugee Definition in Africa and Latin America: The Lessons of Pragmatism' in 
International Journal of Refugee Law Vol 3 No 2 185 at 186 
18
 Okoth-Obbo op cit n5 at 85.  The author further states, at 86, that no systematic travaux 
préparatoires were ever published; that very few original documents exist; and that mainly secondary 
sources can be found.  Research in this area has tended to be based on two pioneer works that were 
published shortly after the Convention's adoption, and '...several subsequent studies have fully relied 
upon key formulations in these papers without further research into the picture which primary 




organized in legal terms.'
19
  Okoth-Obbo confirms that the fact the OAU definition 
came out of a fundamental irrelevance of the 1951 Convention in relation to 
Africa's refugee realities is a 'gross overstatement,' and that actually the OAU 
Convention was developed to address the problem of subversive activities of 
refugees in countries of asylum and the temporal limitation that existed as a result 




Despite the foregoing, the OAU Convention's provisions on asylum, as found in 
Article II of the Convention, 'are considered by many scholars as among its most 
important contribution to refugee jurisprudence in general.'
21
  These provisions 
include the obligation of member states to 'use their best endeavours, consistent 
with their respective legislation, to receive refugees and to secure the settlement of 
those refugees who for well-founded reasons are unable or unwilling to return to 
their country of origin;'
22
 and, its far-reaching provision on non-refoulement, which 
states that: '...no person shall be subjected by a Member State to measures such as 
rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would compel him to return or 
remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened 
for the reasons set out in Article I paragraphs 1 and 2.'
23
   In addition, the OAU 
Convention is recognized as the first international legal instrument, which codified 





Notwithstanding the above-noted actual motivations for the development of the 
OAU Convention, its expanded refugee definition is still considered to be an 
original and forward-looking contribution to refugee jurisprudence.  In this regard, 
according to the OAU Convention: 
 
'...the term refugee shall also apply to every person who, 
owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign 
                                               
19
 Ibid at 90. The author provides may examples of provisions in the OAU Convention that are 
geared to these objectives, such as the stipulation prohibiting subversive activities.  
20
 Ibid at 109-110. See also I Jackson The Refugee Concept in Group Situations (1999) at 178. 
21 Ibid at 88. See Conclusions section of this paper for a brief discussion of whether South Africa is 
upholding these important legal obligations.  
22
 OAU Convention, Art II(1)  
23
 OAU Convention, Art II(3)  




domination or events seriously disturbing public order in 
either a part or the whole of his or her country of origin 
or nationality, is compelled to leave his or her place of 
habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place 





As opposed to the 1951 definition, which requires a refugee to hold a well-founded 
fear of persecution,
26
 there is no such requirement in the OAU refugee definition.  
The focus in determining refugee status according to the OAU definition involves 
'an examination of whether the facts of a specific situation fit within the definition's 




As such, the significance of the OAU definition is that it attempts to link the 
refugee definition with the actual cause of the refugee problems.  In this regard, the 
OAU definition does not refer to the subjective fear of the individual, but rather of 
objective facts: the 'unbearable and dangerous conditions which set entire 
populations on the move.'
28
  As a result of the absence of individual characteristics 
in the OAU refugee definition, it indeed more readily conforms to the realities of 
Africa and other parts of the developing world, in which people are displaced as a 
result of generalized threats, law and order in a society their societies being 
disrupted and the failure or inability of the government of their country of origin to 
protect them.  In this regard, it may be stated that the OAU extended refugee 
definition represents more of a '...communitarian philosophy of asylum which 
focuses on the nature of the community...[in that the] definition is premised on the 
position that the community itself may constitute the threat.'
29
   The fact that the 
OAU definition removes the subjective standard of whether or not a refugee can be 
said to fear persecution represents a significant conceptual adaptation of the 1951 
refugee definition.  This aspect of the OAU expanded refugee definition is 
                                               
25
 OAU Convention, Art I(2).  The OAU Convention firstly, in Art I(1) repeats the 1951 Convention 
refugee definition (with the 1967 Protocol's addition, which removed the geographical and temporal 
limitations from same) and then includes this additional definition of a refugee.  
26
 The basis of which has both a subjective component and an objective component, which is proven 
through an examination of the objective country conditions of the refugee's country of origin or 
nationality.  
27
 Rankin op cit n12 at 5 
28
 MR Rwelamira 'Two Decades of the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa' in 1IJRL (1989) 557 at 559 




noteworthy in that it clearly widens the refugee definition since the definition may 
even '...include within its scope accidental situations not necessarily based on 
deliberate state action.'
30
     
 
Despite this objective aspect of the OAU refugee definition, this definition, as 
Hathaway points out, does not imply that 'victims of natural disasters or economic 
misfortune should become the responsibility of the international community.'
31
  
Rather, Hathaway refers to the ground-breaking OAU refugee definition, in general 
terms, as being applicable to 'all persons compelled to flee across national borders 
by reason of any man-made disaster [emphasis added].'
32
  This is an important 
point to keep in mind, as this paper will later on turn its attention to defining the 
enumerated 'OAU events' that compel individuals to take flight.  In this regard, the 
way in which one defines these events, in particular events seriously disturbing 
public order may lead to greater recognition and hence protection of refugees in 
terms of the OAU definition.  
 
According to Hathaway, the OAU refugee definition contains four significant and 
unprecedented adaptations to the 1951 Convention, which were necessary in order 
to specifically cater for the types of displacement of people in the African context.  
Firstly, the OAU definition acknowledges that fundamental violations of human 
rights or forms of abuse may occur not only due to the calculated acts of 
government, but also due to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or 
a serious disturbance of public order.  This modification '...recognizes the need to 
examine a refugee claim from the perspective of the de facto, rather than the formal, 
authority structure from within the country of origin.'
33
   
 
Secondly, the refugee definition contained in the OAU Convention acknowledges 
the concept of group disfranchisement, in that the definition confirms the legitimacy 
of refugees’ flight as a result of circumstances of generalized danger.
34
  This in turn 
                                               
30 Okoth-Obbo op cit n5 at 112 
31




 Ibid  




has lead to the qualified acceptance of the notion of refugee group determination.
35
  
However, in this regard, and as mentioned above, Okoth-Obbo warns of the 
following: 
  
'Most of the literature on the OAU Convention is 
dominated by the impression that it provides the facility for 
dealing more manageably with refugee status in [mass 
influx] situations.  Nothing could be father from the truth. 
In relation to an elaborate or even only essential set of 
standards pursuant to which the process of refugee status 
determination could be devised and status determination 
operations better structures, organized and delivered in 
mass influx or so-called group situations, the OAU 




Thirdly, according to Hathaway, the expanded OAU refugee definition, allows for 
the possibility that the underlying motivation or rationale for the anticipated harm 
may be indeterminate.  Hathaway explains that:   
 
'…so long as a person is “compelled” to seek refuge 
because of some anticipated serious disruption of public 
order, she need not be in a position to demonstrate any 
linkage between her personal status (or that of some 
collectivity of which she is a member) and the impending 
harm.  Because the African standard emphasizes 
assessment of the gravity of the disruption of public order 
rather than the motives for flight, individuals are largely 
able to decide for themselves when harm is sufficiently 
proximate to warrant flight.' 
37
     
 
Lastly, the fact that the OAU definition includes the phrase in either part or the 
whole of, referring to the refugee’s country of origin, is another important 
adaptation to the original definition, according to Hathaway.  The 1951 definition 
suggests that an individual must necessarily first seek protection within a safe part 
of his or her own country of origin
38
, if such an area exists and it is reasonable for 
                                               
35
 Ibid at 20 
36
 Okoth Obbo op cit n5 at 100 
37
 Hathaway op cit n9 at 18 
38 In refugee determination procedures, this consideration is most commonly known as the Internal 
Flight Alternative (IFA), or the Internal Protection Alternative. According to the UNHCR's 
Guidelines on International Protection: "Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative" within the 
Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 




the person to get there, before seeking refugee protection in a different country.
39
  
The OAU definition, by virtue of the inclusion of this phrase, does not contain this 
requirement.  
 
(iii) Prima facie refugee determination 
 
The concept of prima facie refugee determination refers to the provisional granting 
of refugee status to a person or persons without the formal requirement of 
conducting an individual refugee status determination to establish whether or not 
the displaced person(s) qualify.  Rather than the granting of refugee status based on 
a legal definition, prima facie refuge determination is essentially a device or a 
method to enable, in urgent situations such as a mass-influx, appropriate protection 
measures to be taken when individual refugee status determination procedures are 
impractical.   According to the UNHCR, in effect it is the number of refugees that 




Due to the fact that refugees in Africa tend to move in large groups, the type of 
individual case by case application of the refugee definition as contemplated by the 
1951 Convention was not thought to be practical in the African context.   Prima 
facie or group refugee determination based on evidence of lack of protection in the 
refugee's country of origin
41
, was an appropriate solution that was implied by the 
                                                                                                                                   
by various jurisdictions, with consequently divergent results, rooted either in the 'well-founded fear 
of being persecuted' clause or in the 'unwilling or unable to avail himself of the protection of that 
country' clause of the 1951 definition.  See later in paper for a further discussion of the IFA.   
39 Hathaway op cit n9 at 18-9, where the author points to three sensible reasons for this adaptation to 
the refugee definition: one being issues of distance and unavailability of escape routes due to 
underdeveloped infrastructure or inadequate financial resources; the second being that political 
instability and rapid shifts of poser may mean that ‘what is a safe region today may be dangerous 
tomorrow;’ and the third relates to the artificial Colonial borders in Africa, which may mean that 
family or ethnic ties stretch across national boundaries. 
40
 UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1992) at 13 par 44, where it is 
stated: 'While refugee status must normally be determined on an individual basis, situations have 
also arisen in which entire groups have been displaced under circumstances indicating that members 
of the group could be considered individually as refugees. In such situations, the need to provide 
assistance is extremely urgent and it may not be possible for purely practical reasons to carry out an 
individual determination of refugee status for each member of the group. Recourse has therefore 
been had to the so-called group determination of refugee status, whereby each member of the group 
is regarded as prima facie (i.e. in the absence of evidence to the contrary) as a refugee.'  
41
 Such as establishing that law and order has broken down or that civil war has erupted or that 






  As established above, however, the OAU Convention 
does not actually provide for this mechanism.  In fact, the 'OAU Convention is 
neither the source, nor the authority for "prima facie" or "group determination" of 
refugee status...[as] nowhere in its definition of a refugee or the provisions on 




The discussion relating to prima facie refugee determination is particularly relevant 
to the South African refugee status determination procedure, in that the research 
conducted for this paper indicates that prima facie refugee determination is, to an 
extent, occurring within the country's refugee status determination process, despite 
the fact that the country's governing refugee legislation does not provide for same.  
Rather, South African law provides for an individualized refugee status 
determination hearing that is required to take place for every asylum seeker who 
applies for asylum in South Africa.  Reliance on the existence of the OAU refugee 
definition in the South African legislation likely accounts for this practice, amongst 
other reasons.  This issue will be examined in further detail in the South African 
section below.  Prior to doing so, the paper will proceed to scrutinize the OAU 
refugee definition by examining each element of same in an attempt to determine its 
precise legal meaning and consequently the manner in which the definition should 
be applied, in order to ensure that those requiring protection receive it.    
 




With the adoption of the OAU Convention, its expanded refugee definition 
incorporated new terminology never before used in international law.  The use of 
such new terminology 'reflected the urgency of responding to the African 
reality,...established an important precedent in international law,...responded to 
obvious humanitarian concerns, and sought to provide a practical solution to the 
problem of determining refugee status.'
44
  According to M Rankin, however, the 
                                               
42
 G Goodwin Gill The Refugee in International Law 2nd Ed (1991) at 78-79 
43
 Okoth-Obbo op cit n5 at 120 




OAU refugee definition is significantly vague and ambiguous, even though there is 
'an intuitive sense to its meaning.'
45
  In this regard, Rankin comments that the 
'extended definition raises a number of serious interpretive problems ranging from 
assumptions about its nature to more specific concerns about its content.'
46
  In 2005, 
Rankin undertook a comprehensive study to propose legally relevant criteria for 
interpreting each element of the OAU refugee definition, which is the only work 
currently in existence found by the researcher that assumed such an endeavour.    
 
In order to determine whether South African decision-makers are correctly applying 
the OAU refugee definition, it is important to initially dissect and attempt to define 
the various elements of the definition.  Unfortunately, due to lack of publicly-
available travaux préparatoires or primary sources regarding the formulation of the 
OAU Convention, limited evidence of state practice, and a scarcity of existing 
jurisprudence dealing with the application of the OAU refugee definition in other 
countries, the task of interpreting the definition is a difficult one.    
 
With the above in mind, the principles of treaty interpretation as found in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
47
 (hereinafter the "Vienna Convention") 
which were held to be part of customary international law by the International Court 
of Justice in the 1994 case of Chad v Libya,
48
 are of limited use.  According to the 
Vienna Convention, interpretation should begin with the text of the treaty.  More 
specifically, Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention states that ‘…a treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’
49
  In 
                                               
45
 Rankin Op cit n12 at 1 
46
 Ibid at 11 
47 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 115 UNTS 331 (hereinafter “Vienna Convention”)  
48
 Libya v Chad case (1994) ICJ Reports 4 at par 41. 
49
 Art 31(1), Vienna Convention. The subsequent subsections in this Article provide further 
instructions as to how to establish the context of a treaty, as well as, for example directions regarding 
any agreements made between the parties to the treaty.  More specifically, Art 31(2) states that ‘the 
context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, 
including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made 
between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was 
made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the 
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3.There shall be taken into account, together with 
the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 




addition, recourse to ‘supplementary means of interpretation including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the 
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31’
50
 is provided for in Article 
32 of the Vienna Convention.   As stated above, however, the concern remains that 
there is little existing information to guide researchers, in terms of the OAU 
Convention’s drafters' preparatory work and hence their intentions.  This is 
particularly so with regard to the OAU Convention's refugee definition.   
 
(ii) Scope of application of the definition 
 
Prior to analysing each of its elements, it is necessary to determine to whom the 
OAU refugee definition specifically applies.  This question arises because of the 
definition's words every person, which need to be considered.  According to 
Rankin, some African States view the OAU refugee definition as applying only to 
Africans.  The basis for this position may possibly be found in the Convention's 
main objective, that as a regional complement to the 1951 Convention, it was 
created in order to meet the specific needs of African refugees, which may suggest 
an intention on the part of its drafters to limit its territorial application to Africa.
51
   
However, the plain meaning of the words every person clearly points to a more 
inclusive interpretation, meaning that the definition's application ought to be 
universal.   Furthermore, the 1951 Convention's universal application, stemming 
from the same inclusive wording provides evidence of the requirement of similar 
application.  This broader line of interpretation is also more consistent with the 




In addition, as commented further by Rankin, an inclusive interpretation of the 
words every person is more consistent to the purpose and intention of refugee 
protection in general.  In this regard, it is a generally accepted international legal 
principle that 'presence within State territory is a juridically relevant fact sufficient 
                                                                                                                                   
international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 4.A special meaning shall be given 
to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. 
50
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South African law 
conforms to this inclusive position.  For example, in the case of Patel v Minister of 
Home Affairs
54
 the court held that, as a result of the wording of the Bill of Rights
55
 
in which most of the rights are for the benefit of ‘everyone,’ aliens have the same 
rights under the Constitution that citizens have, unless the contrary emerges from 
the Constitution.  Furthermore, this inclusive position is found in South African 
refugee law, which has been informed by the country's advanced Constitution.  
Section 10 of South Africa’s Bill of Rights of the Constitution provides that: 




In the case of Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Watchenuka and 
Another,
57
 the Supreme Court of South Africa held that the term everyone included 
asylum seekers.
58
   
 
According to the above-noted principle of law and related jurisprudence, therefore, 
one can assert that an ‘…inclusive reading of the extended refugee definition is a 
more consistent interpretation than an exclusive reading….[and it is still] relevant to 
a principled application of the extended definition.’
59
  L de la Hunt, a noted South 
African refugee advocate, supports this inclusive interpretation, claiming that the 
OAU definition should 'apply universally and equally to all applicants, regardless of 
their country of origin,'
60
  Notwithstanding this point, the actual position that the 
South African government takes in relation to the scope of the OAU refugee 
definition is what remains relevant to the within study.  In this regard, it is 
necessary to examine what transpires in South Africa's refugee determination 
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procedure, a topic that will be reviewed in further detail in the relevant South 
African section below.   
 
(iii) The OAU definition’s enumerated events 
 
The fact that four specific grounds, or particular harmful events that may compel 
someone to take flight, are enumerated in the OAU definition indicates that the 
Convention's drafters seemingly intended to be quite explicit about the types of 
events that can cause flight and thereby justify the granting of refugee status refugee 
status.  While these enumerated grounds also reflect the definition's broadness and 
flexibility, this does not necessarily assist with understanding the true scope of these 
events.   
 
For example, similar to Hathaway's above-noted interpretation, according to MR 
Rwelamira, the grounds of external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or 
events seriously disturbing public order are 'designed to cover a variety of man-
made conditions which do not allow people to reside safely in their countries of 
origin [emphasis added].'
61
  Meanwhile, a plain reading of the phrase events 
seriously disturbing public order does not necessarily indicate why an 
environmental catastrophe such as drought or earthquake cannot seriously disturb 
the public order. 
 
In light of the above, it is necessary to seek interpretation and attempt to define 
these enumerated events.  The focus of the below section will primarily be upon the 
'catch-all' phrase of events seriously disturbing public order, as this is the broader 
category as compared to the three other events, which can be said to comprise a 
group of war-like situations.    
 
a. External aggression, occupation and foreign domination 
 
As E Arboleda noted in the above quote, the inclusion of the events external 
aggression, occupation and foreign domination was probably prompted as a result 
                                               




of the African reality, which at the time included violent wars of independence or 
civil wars, and the consequent humanitarian concerns.  In light of the fact that the 
'specific revolutionary situations'
62
 for which these three terms in the OAU refugee 
definition refer to may no longer exist, with most African countries having already 
gained independence, these 'components of the expanded definition could thus be 
said to be irrelevant today.'
63
  However, as Okoth-Obbo remarks, these grounds 
'could also be viewed as vessels still possessed of the capacity for the legal 
transcription of Africa's refugee realities of today.'
64
  In this regard, the recent 1998-
2002 war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in which several foreign armies 
such as Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Angola were present in the country, may 
have easily fit into this definition.  Similarly, the invasions by Ethiopian troops into 
Somalia, or Chadian soldiers in the Darfur region of Sudan may breathe new life 
into the use of these specific terms.   Furthermore, and as will be discussed later in 
this paper, the fact that the OAU refugee definition was wholly incorporated into 
South Africa's national legislation means that these events may be applied to not 
only Africans, but other persons seeking asylum in South Africa based on the 
situations in their countries of origin.  The current situation in Iraq, for example, 
may also qualify as external aggression, occupation or foreign domination. 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is significant to acknowledge that the terms 
external aggression, occupation and foreign domination were not yet established in 
international law practice at the time of the adoption of the 1969 OAU Convention, 
and 'today there is still no consensus on the meaning of intervention in international 
law.'
65
  For example, the basic concept of aggression, while discussed in 
international forums prior to 1969, was not formally defined until 1974.  The United 
Nation's General Assembly set up a Special Committee to determine the definition 
of aggression, which in 1974 finally agreed on the following definition of the term: 
'aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
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integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner 




In terms of the meaning of occupation, humanitarian law provides an unambiguous 
definition of the term.  For example, Article 2 of the Geneva Convention (IV) 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War states that the Geneva 
Convention applies to 'all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a 
High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no resistance.'
67
  
This definition is 'germane to refugee problems in Africa because it focuses on the 
de facto control of territory, whether occupation is "partial or total," [and] 'even if a 




Of the three war-like events in the first category of enumerated OAU grounds, the 
meaning of foreign domination poses the most difficulty.  The term seems to refer 
to the liberation struggles against colonialism, and while it has been used in various 
international documents and declarations, a clear definition of same has not yet 
been put forth.  For example, the term is referred to in Article 20(3) of the Banjul 
Charter which states that: '...all peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the 
State parties to the present Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign 
domination, be it political, economic or cultural.'
69
   Rankin suggests that the 
broader concept of foreign domination may have been included due to the drafters' 
concerns that aggression and occupation did not fully convey the legal status of a 
colonial territory.  This is due to the fact that, at the time colonial expansion was not 
considered an infringement on a conquered state's sovereignty.  Technically 
speaking, 'occupation and aggression require the interaction of two sovereign 
powers' as opposed to colonial state situation, where the colonial government is 
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vested with sovereignty.  On the other hand, in a state of occupation or aggression, 




b. Events seriously disturbing public order  
 
According to Rankin, this second, broader category of OAU events 'arguably has a 
function comparable to "particular social group" in the 1951 refugee definition: that 
is, it acts as a basket clause capturing a generic set of refugee producing 
situations.'
71
  Many scholars, such as Hathaway, as noted above, consider that this 
category can include any man-made event.  In fact, on the face of it and especially 
with regard to the African context, this category can possibly also include 'victims 
of ecological changes such as famine or drought, which remain among the most 
challenging situations on the continent.'
72
   In order to understand the extent of this 
category and to provide a legal basis for its meaning, this category of OAU events 
requires particular in-depth attention.   
    
1. The effect of ‘seriously disturbing’  
Prior to examining the meaning of public order, it is relevant to look at the phrase 
seriously disturbing.  These words, especially that of seriously, serve to inform of 
the level or extent of disturbance required for the OAU event to qualify as one that 
compels a person to take flight.    
According to the ordinary meaning of the word, disturb means '1. a. trans. To 
agitate and destroy (quiet, peace, rest); to break up the quiet, tranquility, or rest of (a 
person, a country, etc.); to stir up, trouble, disquiet.'
73
  The adverb seriously 
connotes the intensity or extent to which the event in question must disturb the 
public order.  In this sense, one may take it to mean that the OAU event must 
earnestly, with gravity; not lightly or superficially disturb the public order.  
Accordingly, the 'OAU Convention’s text suggests that there is an objective, 
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quantitative element captured by the terms "seriously disturbing."'
74
  Rankin 
explains this point further as follows:  
 
‘By placing “disturbance” alongside “public order,” the 
Convention’s text suggests that it is concerned by 
disturbance in the public context. And by including the 
term “serioulsy,” there is an indication that the gravity of 
the harm must be greater than emotional distress. 
Consequently, the test should be an objective assessment 
which considers the gravity of the harm in relation to what 




2. The meaning of public order 
The term public order is a particular legal concept that is found in several 
international treaties, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
76
, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
77
 as well as the 1951 
Convention.  It is also mentioned in other parts of the OAU Convention, such as 
Article 3(1) relating to Subversive Activities
78
 and Article 6(1) relating to Travel 
Documents.
79
   
Rankin suggests that the term public order was meant to be read in the technical 
sense and in the same way as it is intended to be read in the 1951 Convention for 
the following reasons:  
'First, the final draft of the OAU Convention substituted 
"internal subversion" with "public order" because the 
former was considered too ambiguous. This suggests an 
intention to use the term in its technical sense.  And second, 
because the OAU Convention is the complement to the 
1951 Convention, and because public order appears in both 
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The 1951 Convention contains the term public order in its Article 32, which deals 
with the context of expulsion of refugees.  More specifically, this Article states that 
‘...contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territories save on 
grounds of national security or public order.’
81
  While the words national security 
are rather clear, as acts performed in contravention of same would include those of 
‘a serious nature threatening directly or indirectly the government, the integrity or 
the independence of the state on whose territory a refugee stays,’
82
 the term public 
order are not as apparent, as it is open to a wide range of interpretations.  
In the discussions leading up to the 1951 Convention, due to the uncertainty over 
the precise meaning of the term public order amongst representatives of common 
and civil law states
83
, in the 'spirit of compromise however, there was a general 
agreement that public order should be given a narrow interpretation, with travaux 
préparatoires serving as a definitive point of reference for state parties in 
interpreting their authority to expel refugees on public order grounds.'
84
  Therefore, 
'only the commission of a serious crime (not any crime) is grounds for public order 
expulsion and other concerns - such as basic affronts to public morality or social 




A Grahl-Madsen confirms the above position regarding the expulsion of refugees 
on the ground of public order by also referring to the 1951 Convention's travaux 
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préparatoires, which state that the meaning of public order for the purposes of the 
expulsion of a refugee, was 'intended to be a reference to acts prejudicial to the 
'peace and tranquillity of society at large.'
86
  He summarizes his position by stating 
that 'the common criteria seems to be that public order is at stake only in cases 
where a refugee constitutes a threat to an uncertain number of persons carrying out 
their lawful occupations (habitual criminal, wanton killers), or to society at large, 
as in the case of riots or unrest, or traffic of drugs.'
87
 
Armed with a better understanding of the term public order in the context of 
expulsion of refugees on the ground thereof, it is still necessary to comprehend how 
the term may be applied in other contexts.  For example, in the context of human 
rights law, the term may 'demonstrate a rare area of reciprocal interest between an 
individual and the state...[as] it looks to the basic standards governing the state in 
its relation to the community and its individual members.'
88
     
According to N Jayawickrama, the term public order ordinarily means the 
prevention of disorder or crime, however it is actually something more than 
ordinary maintenance of law and order.
89
  In his seminal work The Application of 
Human Rights Law: National, Regional and International Jurisprudence, in 
determining whether an act affects public order or law and order, Jayawikrama 
explains that the term public order: 
'...is synonymous with public peace, safety and tranquillity, 
an absence of public disorder.  The test...is to ask whether it 
leads to the disturbance of the life of the community; or 
whether it affects merely an individual, leaving the 
tranquillity of society undisturbed. It is a question of degree 
and the extent of the reach of the act upon society.  Thus, 
communal disturbances, the creation of internal strife or 
rebellion and strikes promoted with the sole aim of causing 
unrest in the labour force, are obvious instances of act 
impacting against public order. In short, public order 
implies an absence of violence and an orderly state of 
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With regard to the position that public order relates to the standards governing the 
State in relation to its communities and citizens, Rankin raises the question of how 
to characterize the minimum standards of public order.  She reviews a variety of 
thresholds to determine same, such as that of non-international armed conflict and, 
on a lower threshold, internal disturbances and tensions and concludes that they all 
fall within the definition of public order because 'they occur on a sufficiently wide 
scale and because they violate a core set of human rights which fundamentally 
undermines the peace and tranquillity of a society at large.'
91
 
The above being said, the question remains whether a situation of widespread 
violations of human rights may also find itself within a reading of events serious 
disturbing public order.  The author of this paper submits that, in light of the OAU 
Convention's underlying rationale and function, being to extend refugee protection 
to those persons not easily falling within the 1951 definition, violations of 
fundamental human rights on a sufficiently large scale indeed suggest  that public 
order has been disturbed.  In light of the first category of OAU events, Rankin 
concurs and argues that there is an 'underlying concern [in the OAU definition] 
about a substantial disruption to the community as a whole and to the basic 
principles that ought to govern relationships within a given community.'  As such, 
she concludes that 'to seriously disturb public order should be seen as event-type 
involving violence or threats against an indeterminate number of people or to 
society at large [emphasis added].'
92
   
Serious or massive violations of human rights should therefore qualify as threats to 
people or to society at large.  Fundamental human rights clearly include, amongst 
others, the right to life and the prohibition against torture or cruel, inhumane or 
degrading punishment.  However, whether serious violations of persons' socio-
economic rights can be included in this manner, as opposed to merely violations of 
civil and political rights, is another unresolved aspect of this part of the OAU 
definition. 
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Finally, it is also unclear whether or not environmental disasters would constitute 
events serious disturbing public order.  As stated above, on the plain reading of the 
text, there is no obvious reason why this cannot be the case.  However, the author 
concurs with Andrew E. Shacknove, who explains that natural disasters should not 
necessarily be included in the definition:  
'When determining who is, or who is not, entitled to 
refugee status, natural disasters, such as floods and 
droughts, are usually dismissed as the bases for justified 
claims. Unlike the violent acts one person perpetuates 
against another, such disasters are not considered 
"political" events. They are, supposedly, sources of 
vulnerability beyond social control which therefore impose 
no obligation on a government to secure a remedy.  The 
bonds uniting citizens and state are said to endure even 
when the infrastructure or harvest of a region is obliterated. 
For even an ideally just state cannot save us from 
earthquakes, hurricanes, or eventual death. The legitimacy 
of the state rests exclusively on its control of human actions 
rather than on its control of natural forces, and the 
obligation of a government extends no further than the 
realm of human capabilities.'
93
 
Rankin also proposes that because the category of events serious disturbing public 
order is a 'basket clause,' it should be read ejusdem generis to mean events that are 
common to the man-made events of aggression, occupation and foreign 
domination.
94
  In this regard, Rankin concludes that: 
'Disruptions to public order are about breakdowns in 
human relationships and antagonisms within the 
community. The OAU Convention's communitarian 
perspective rests on a belief that the community can 
become a threat to itself or to the well-being of its 
members. A natural disaster represents a threat to the 
community, but rather than coming from within, a natural 
disaster is an event which sees the community confront 
collective adversity from the outside. Still, it should be 
made equally clear that this does not licence a government 
or non-state actor to use natural disasters in pursuit of its 
own agenda. The definition would seem to capture the 
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effects of a famine caused by states actions since this is 
merely using nature as a tool to a political end.'
95
  
(iv) in either part or the whole of  his country of origin or nationality 
As mentioned previously, and according to international refugee law 
jurisprudence
96
 and soft law
97
, the 1951 Convention definition of a refugee implies 
that a person must first seek protection, if possible, to another specific region or 
area of his or her own country where there is no risk of a well-founded fear of 
persecution prior to seeking international refugee protection.  This is more 
commonly known as the Internal Flight Alternative (IFA).  However, in terms of 
the OAU refugee definition, the words 'in either part or the whole of his country of 
origin or nationality' specifically clarify that the IFA is an irrelevant consideration 
when determining refugee status.
98
   These words therefore significantly extend the 
refugee definition and are 'probably explained by the inherently chaotic and 
unstable nature of the OAU events.'
99
  
Despite the foregoing, the words in either part of the whole of also raise the issue 
regarding the necessary nexus between the OAU event and the person being 
compelled to take flight.   In this regard, Rankin poses the question of whether an 
asylum seeker can be declared a refugee if their flight was prompted by an event 
that took place in any part of their country of origin?  She answers this question in 
the negative by proposing that the aforementioned nexus is created as a result of the 
fact that the asylum seeker is compelled to leave his 'place of habitual residence.'  
As such, the asylum seeker would likely not be compelled to take flight if the OAU 
event takes place in a region too distant and thus does not pose any risk or danger 
to the individual.
100
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Lastly, another unique commentary on this aspect of the OAU definition relates to 
the inter-relationship of the phrase 'in part or whole of' to that of 'place of habitual 
residence' as well as 'compelled to leave.'  In this regard, Rankin questions what 
would happen if a person, who may be visiting or temporarily working in a 
different part of the country, is caught up in an OAU event in that place and is 
unable to return home?
101
  Similarly, what would happen if, when that person is 
away, an OAU event in his or her place of habitual residence erupts, which 
prevents him or her from returning home?  The result, in such situations, may be 
‘an effective internal flight alternative,’
102
 despite the fact that as mentioned above, 
the OAU refugee definition does not require an IFA.  In any event, if a person in 
one of these situations ends up fleeing elsewhere outside of his or her country, such 
a quandary can be disentangled with an examination of all relevant factors, always 
bearing in mind the prospective or future looking definition of a refugee.   
(v) Compelled to leave 
As stated above, the OAU refugee definition is distinguished from the 1951 
Convention refugee definition on the basis that, inter alia, it does not contain a 
subjective element; rather it is predicated on the objective events which prompt a 
refugee to take flight.  While the word 'compelled' is admittedly an ambiguous one, 
it nevertheless seems to support the objective nature of the OAU definition.  This is 
due in part to the plain meaning of the word, in part to the meaning of the word 
when taking consideration of the text associated with it
103
, and also when taking 
into account the fact that the OAU definition is meant to be inclusive and should 
therefore be read flexibly.
104
  
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word compelled means 
'constrained, forced or necessitated.'
105
  In the refugee definition, the original French 
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text of the OAU Convention uses the word 'obligée,'
106
 which also connotes that a 
person is forced or obliged to take flight due to one of the enumerated events, which 
according to Rankin represent the 'irresistible force.'
107
  Furthermore, the word 
compelled when 'read in conjunction with the enumerated events or the reasons that 
cause the compulsion, indicates that such a fear or similar notion is assumed to 
exist...[and that] imply something more than a subjective choice.'
108
   
In analysing this particular phase in the OAU refugee definition, Rankin comments 
on another interesting and related interpretive issue. The plain meaning of the 
words compelled to leave could result in an exclusion of the possibility of a sur 
place
109
 refugee claim, in which a person who is already outside of their country of 
origin or nationality 'when an OAU event takes place would not be compelled to 
leave, but would be compelled to remain.'
110
  Once again, however, if reading the 
OAU Convention in the spirit of good faith and in an approach consistent with the 
1951 Convention definition, one can only conclude that the OAU definition should 
allow for sur place claims.   
(vi) Place of habitual residence 
As compared to the 1951 refugee definition, in order to satisfy the OAU definition, 
a person must have been compelled to flee from his or her place of habitual 
residence, rather than the entire country of origin.  This phrase within the definition 
therefore implies a required geographic nexus between the OAU event and the 
person's place of habitual residence.  It may also reflect the 'underlying spirit' of the 
OAU Convention, being a communitarian approach to refugee protection in which 
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an asylum country may provide a 'surrogate community' for persons whose lives or 
safety are at risk in their own communities.
111
    
It is important to determine a definition of place of habitual residence in terms of 
the aforementioned nexus.  In attempting to establish same, Rankin reviewed a 
number of sources, ranging from academic papers to international case-law and soft 
law.  While no universal standard was found, Rankin established the following 
elements, which characterize the term habitual residence: 
‘...[F]irst, habitual residence is a heavily fact based 
question. Second, in determining habitual residence, 
regard should be had both to a person's duration of stay 
and to whether their actions indicate a settled purpose. 
Third, a settled purpose involves considering a person's 
attachment to a particular location as evidenced by 
familial linkage, social and cultural relations, economic 
factors and other matters related to a person's ordinary 
mode of living. Finally, a person's intention to habitually 




In light of the lack of requirement that, in terms of the OAU definition, a refugee 
must seek an internal flight alternative, there exists an additional interpretive 
difficulty in terms of place of habitual residence, which is based on the not so 
atypical course of flight of a displaced person.  Often, as may be the case, a 
displaced person may leave his or her place of habitual residence due to an OAU 
event but not cross an international border.  For example, he or she may be 
internally displaced from his or her place of habitual residence and thereafter take 
up residence in several secondary locations in his or her country of origin before 
finally fleeing across the border.  In such a case, as Rankin astutely points out, a 
distinction needs to be made between a place of habitual residence and a "simple 
residence" as an asylum seeker may have many simple residences after the initial 
displacement. The test is, therefore, whether a new place of habitual residence 
becomes established.  If so, it may be assumed that the original compulsion to flee 
due to the OAU event will have ceased and unless another OAU event takes place, 
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(vii) Conclusion  
The above section of the paper clearly demonstrates the numerous ambiguities and 
difficulties that exist in defining the OAU refugee definition.  Searching for a legal 
basis to the various aspects of the definition is nevertheless an important 
undertaking as it assists in understanding how to properly apply the definition. 
Unfortunately, as will be seen below, there is a serious lack of international and 
national jurisprudence to assist decision-makers in South Africa with interpreting 
the various elements of the definition judiciously.  Accordingly, a review of 
scholarly material analyzing South African refugee status determination practice 
and some unreported, rather not currently publicly available South Africa Refugee 
Appeal Board decisions, will be reviewed below to establish how the definition is 
being applied and interpreted in South Africa to date.  
III. The South African position 
(i) Background: History of refugee protection in South Africa 
 
During the Apartheid era, South Africa was regarded as a refugee-generating rather 
than a refugee-receiving country.  This was a time in which many of the country's 
black struggle heroes were forced into exile, and the Apartheid regime only granted 
a form of ad-hoc asylum to a small number of white persons who were fleeing from 
countries such as Rhodesia or Mozambique.
114
  Moreover, during Apartheid, the 
South African government was the root cause of the forced displacement of mass 
numbers of persons in neighbouring southern African countries, as a result of the 
actions of its military.  The political stability in the country since its transition to 
democracy in 1994, however, has opened up South Africa to migrants from 
different parts of the world. 
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In 1993, as the Apartheid system began to break down, the government of South 
Africa signed a Basic Agreement with the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (hereinafter the ‘UNHCR’) to begin accepting refugees and provide 
protection to persons within its territory who were fleeing their countries on the 
grounds set out in both refugee Conventions.  Subsequently, South Africa signed 
the international and regional Conventions regulating the protection of refugees; it 
acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol on 12 January 1996 
and to the 1969 OAU Convention on 15 December 1995.   Shortly thereafter, South 
Africa embarked on an extensive consultative process,
115
 which led to the creation 
of its first domestic piece of legislation specifically dealing with the status 
determination and protection of refugees.   
 
South Africa's Refugees Act 130 of 1998 (hereinafter the “Refugees Act”) was 
promulgated by Parliament in the end of 1998, and it came into force in April 2000.  
The Refugees Act is considered to be very progressive and rights-based in its 
approach to refugee protection.  This is in line with South Africa’s constitutional 
democratization process at the time, in which the overall aim was to establish a 
human rights based society.  The Refugees Act contains both the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and 1969 OAU Convention definitions of a refugee.
116
 
To better comprehend the way in which the drafters of the Refugees Act intended 
the OAU refugee definition to be interpreted and applied in South Africa, it is 
relevant to examine the official documentation which preceded the passing of the 
Act.  In this regard, the Draft Green and White Papers are the sources that may be 
relied upon. Unfortunately, they do not shed much light on the issue.  The Draft 
Green Paper on International Migration
117
 contained various recommendations 
pertaining to a separate and self-standing piece of refugee legislation in South 
Africa, which should:  
‘…be based on a model of refugee protection that is rights-
based, solution-oriented, with the sharing of the burden 
across all SADC member states.  The objective of the 
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model is to provide temporary protection to persons whose 




The Green Paper only refers briefly to the OAU refugee definition, indicating that it 
is applicable in the South African context, however, it does not expand on its 
intended meaning.  On the other hand, South Africa's Draft Refugee White Paper
119
 
provides some insight into the way in which the drafters of the country's refugee 
legislation intended that the extended refugee definition be taken to mean.  The 
Draft White Paper stated that the ‘OAU definition should be interpreted to include 
those who have come to South Africa because their lives, safety or freedom are 
threatened [by the OAU events].’
120
  In making this statement, the drafters of the 
White Paper used terms very similar to the expanded refugee definition found in the 
1984 Cartagena Declaration,
121
 which drew inspiration from the OAU 
Convention.
122
   Furthermore, in terms of the extent of the application of the 
definition, the White Paper goes on to warn against using the OAU definition ‘to 
include victims of poverty and other social or economic hardships, environmental 





(ii) Section 3(b) of South Africa's Refugees Act 
 
Prior to examining whether or not South Africa judiciously applies the OAU 
Convention refugee definition, it is necessary to briefly note the subtle differences 
between the OAU Convention's refugee definition and the way the definition has 
been included in South Africa's national legislation.  According to section 3(b) of 
the Refugees Act: 
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 ‘A person qualifies for refugee status for the purposes of 
this Act if that person…owing to external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously 
disturbing or disrupting public order in either a part or 
the whole of his or her country of origin or nationality, is 
compelled to leave his or her place of habitual residence 




As compared to the OAU Convention definition, the South African version of the 
expanded definition includes the words or disrupting, with regard to the description 
of the magnitude of harm that this second basket-clause category of OAU events 
must amount to, in order to justify a person's flight.  The researcher has not been 
able to find any materials that point to a reason for this added word, but one must 
assume a purpose as to why the drafters chose to include it, because otherwise why 
would they have done so. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, it appears as 
though the word disrupt has a slightly stronger connotation than the word disturb, 
with its definition being: '1. intr. To burst asunder. rare. 2. trans. To break or burst 
asunder; to break in pieces, shatter; to separate forcibly.'
125
 It is thus possible that 
the drafters, by including this word, intended to simply clarify the extent to which 
the public order must be disturbed or disrupted such that an individual would be 
compelled to take flight.   
Another slight modification of the OAU definition in the South African Refugees 
Act is the use of the word elsewhere as opposed to another place outside his 
country of origin or nationality.  Interestingly, the plain reading of the word 
elsewhere does not necessarily imply that this refugee definition contains an 
alienage requirement, such as in the 1951 definition, that is to say that an asylum 
seeker needs to be outside of his or her country of origin in order to qualify for 
refugee status.
126
  It is assumed, however that this is indeed the case, as the drafters 
of the Refugees Act likely intended to replicate the position of the OAU 
Convention definition, which is influenced by the 1951 Convention definition and 
which clearly requires alienage as a pre-requisite to someone being considered a 
refugee. 
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In terms of the scope of application of section 3(b) of the Refugees Act, as noted 
earlier, the question remains whether in South Africa this definition applies to 
every person or rather only to every African.  This question may be answered by 
examining the actual manner in which refugee status determinations take place in 
the country, as well as asylum statistics of the Department of Home Affairs. The 
following section of the paper will examine this subject in further detail.  
(iii) South African refugee status determination process and the OAU definition: a 
form of prima facie refugee status determination?  
In South Africa, it is the responsibility of the Department of Home Affairs to 
determine the status of refugees.  The Refugees Act created essentially a two-tiered 
process for refugee determination in which asylum applications are received by a 
Refugee Reception Officer, at one of five designated Refugee Reception Offices in 
the country, and then heard or determined by a Refugee Status Determination 
Officer.  An unsuccessful asylum seeker may appeal his or her unfounded rejection 
to the Refugee Appeal Board, or his or her manifestly unfounded rejection to the 
Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs, both of which are quasi-judicial 
independent administrative tribunals established under the Refugees Act.
127
   
While the Refugees Act provides for special measures or powers of the Minister of 
Home Affairs to be taken in times of a mass-influx of refugees into the country
128
, 
it was anticipated, and in fact legislated that in the normal course, each asylum 
seeker in South Africa receives an individual refugee status determination.  As 
mentioned previously, prima facie refugee determination came about as a practical 
solution in situations where entire groups of persons become displaced due to 
reasons that indicate that each member of the group could be individually 
considered as a refugee.  With this in mind, in the South African context, the 
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individual process of refugee status determination comes into cross-roads with the 
OAU refugee definition and the process of prima facie refugee determination, 
which is normally only used in times of emergency.  This is because 'it appears that 
South Africa applies a form of prima facie asylum determination that is not related 
to a mass-influx situation, but rather depends on whether it is "obvious" than an 
applicant is a refugee, based on the danger and instability with a part of the 
applicant's country of origin.'
129
  
I van Beek explains this point further by asserting that in South Africa 'there is not 
only a mixed understanding of the definition of "prima facie refugees"...but on what 
is perceived as a mass influx situation.'
130
  Van Beek's research included interviews 
with Department of Home Affairs officials, who stated that South Africa was at the 
time experiencing a situation of mass-influx as determined by reference to the 
actual number of asylum seekers that were entering the country.   Interestingly, 
several years later, in a more recent Department of Home Affairs: Refugee Affairs 
Directorate's report, this very same conclusion is echoed.  Refugee Affairs, 
throughout its 2006 Annual Report on Asylum Statistics, concludes that South 
Africa is still experiencing a mass-influx of asylum seekers into the country.
131
   
In this regard, there is a clear inconsistency that exists in terms of the legislative 
intent of the Refugees Act as compared to the actual understanding and practice of 
Department of Home Affairs officials at the refugee reception offices.  More 
specifically, the Department of Home Affairs on one hand is stating that there is a 
mass influx of asylum seekers into the country, thereby legitimizing its use of the 
OAU refugee definition in order to “fast track” refugee status determinations.  
However, on the other hand, the Minister has never implemented the special 
provisions, in terms of her powers under section 35 of the Refugees Act, to deal 
with a mass-influx of asylum seekers into the country, if such was really the case. 
The special provisions that the Minister may invoke include the accommodation of 
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any specific category or group of asylum seekers or refugees in camps or refugee 
reception centres.  To add to the confusion, nowhere in the Refugees Act is the 
term mass-influx actually defined.   
Therefore, while there is seemingly no situation of mass-influx in South Africa at 
this time, the Department of Home Affairs' approach to refugee status 
determination in fact relies on the application of the OAU refugee definition to 
assist in accelerating or "fast-tracking" applications based on a prima facie 
recognition of refugee status.  This can likely be explained as a result of the 
endemic resource and capacity shortages at the Department of Home Affairs: 
Refugee Affairs
132
, which 'pose serious challenges for Refugee Affairs...and have 
overwhelmed the already fragile refugee services.'
133
   
A Tuepker further adds that, in the process of “fast-tracking” applications within 
South Africa's refugee status determination procedure, which includes the use of 
unofficial or non-legislated for practices such as pre-screening processes,
134
 
reliance on implicit "white lists" of refugee producing countries, and the focus on 
merely confirming the nationality of an asylum seeker, indicates that the 
‘institutional culture [among the Department of Home Affairs] overwhelmingly 
supports an automatic link between nationality and refugeehood which produces 
the shared knowledge that asylum is only really for a select group of nationals.'
135
   
In terms of refugee status determination officers' focusing on the nationality of an 
asylum seeker, de la Hunt describes the following practice in more detail as 
follows:  
'While the Department of Home Affairs denies keeping a 
list of "refugee producing countries" or a "white list" there 
is clearly a mindset or institutional culture within the 
department that determines who is a refugee and who is 
not, based on the asylum seeker's country of origin. The 
focus of this country-oriented approach is that, particularly 
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in relation to countries whose nationals are very likely to be 
granted asylum (Somalia, for example), the focus of the 
determination hearing is on getting the asylum seeker to 
"prove" his or her nationality on the basis of his or her 
knowledge of demographics, culture and language, 
geography and the political landscape.'
136
  
The aforementioned practices relied upon by Home Affairs officials may be 
evidenced by the fact that the majority of recognized refugees in South Africa 'are 
from countries in Africa where civil, generalized conflict and the breakdown of 
public order are endemic.'
137
  Lee Anne de la Hunt surmises that Department of 
Home Affairs’ acceptance rates fluctuate depending on the government's 
assessment of the situation in the countries from which the asylum seekers hail.
138
  
She further reasons that the high acceptance rates from these countries are made on 
the basis of the OAU refugee definition, in that: 
'...the letters advising refugees that their asylum claims 
have been successful merely state this fact....[while] most 
of the rejection letters start by declaring that the asylum 
seeker has failed to prove that he or she has a well-founded 
fear of persecution, but then go on to give a (usually 
standardized) assessment of the situation within the country 
of origin (for example, that the country of origin is a 
democracy that protects its citizens) with very little 
analysis, of the actual claim itself, or its merits.'
139
 
The year-on-year increase in the number of asylum seekers arriving in South Africa 
undoubtedly places a burden on the already strained refugee services in the country.   
To some extent therefore it is understandable that 'at least implicitly...Home Affairs 
officials prefer easy acceptances on the basis of the OAU definition; it also appears, 
however, that they do not deal satisfactorily with claims arising from the 
Convention's narrower definition based on a persecution standard.
140
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 Ibid at 36. This practice is confirmed by the researcher's personal experience as a refugee legal 
counselor, having through the course of her employment, read hundreds of RSDO's rejection letters, 
which predominantly state that the asylum seeker does not qualify for refugee status because while 
he or she showed fear of past persecution, it could not be found that he or she would be persecuted 
upon return to their country of origin.  




As a consequence of the Department of Home Affairs' approach that the OAU 
definition patently supports the notion of refugee-generating countries, there 
appears to be another disturbing practice amongst the Department’s officials, 
related to the limiting of the number of applicants who can apply for asylum.  Many 
asylum seekers are simply refused entrance to the Refugee Reception Offices.  For 
the most part, this practice is recognizably arbitrary and based on the large numbers 
of asylum seekers that queue outside the offices each day
141
, but it may also be on 
account of an applicant's nationality.  In this regard, the following specific 
examples come to mind. Two particular clients at the researcher's office, one of 
Nepalese nationality and the other hailing from Fiji, were time and again denied 
access to the Cape Town Refugee Reception Office, having been advised by Home 
Affairs officials that Nepal and Fiji are safe countries and that they therefore could 
not be asylum seekers.   
With the above being said, it would seem as if at first instance, that is to say at the  
Refugee Status Determination Officer interview level, the OAU refugee definition 
or section 3(b) of the Refugees Act is in fact only applied to African asylum 
seekers.  Tuepker confirmed this fact in an interview she conducted with a 
Department of Home Affairs: Head Office official.
142
  Furthermore, L de la Hunt 
concludes that 'both the [Department of Home Affairs asylum] statistics 
themselves, as well as conversations with Home Affairs officials, indicate that the 
benefits of the extended definition are only available to African refugees.'
143
 
L de la Hunt questions, given the nature of refugee flows to South Africa, why the 
country adopted an individualized refugee determination system, and suggests that 
'with hindsight, the Refugees Act may have benefited from a provision for fast-
tracking of cases based on OAU Convention circumstances, or a modified group 
determination process.'
144
  Aside from the fact that the legislative framework for 
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refugee status determination in South Africa does not provide for the type of prima-
facie refugee status determination which has clearly emerged, another particular 
problem that may arise with the use of such a practice is that such refugee status 
determinations fail to recognize that some applicants from 'refugee-generating' 
countries may also have individualized refugee claims, or in other words a well-
founded fear of persecution.  Ignoring this fact, or not providing each asylum 
seeker with the opportunity to fully explain his or her individualized reasons for 
fleeing his or her country, may have a negative effect on that refugee later on if or 
when the Department decides to invoke cessation of the refugee's status, based on 
the fact that the presumed conditions which caused the refugee to flee cease to 
exist.
145
   
(iv) The position of the Refugee Appeal Board 
According to the experience of the researcher and as per the literature reviewed, the 
first instance decisions in South Africa’s asylum process, in other words the 
decisions of Refugee Status Determination Officers (hereinafter RSDOs), are 
generally of such poor quality such that a specific determination as to their 
application of the OAU definition cannot be properly gleaned from same.  In this 
regard, the RSDOs' decisions granting an applicant refugee status do not provide 
reasons for same, for example whether or not the applicant even was approved in 
terms of section 3(b) of the Act. Rather, they simply state ‘…[T]he application for 
asylum in respect of yourself has been approved…and your formal recognition of 
refugee status is hereby attached.’
146
   
On the other hand, decisions rejecting an asylum seeker’s application must set out 
reasons for same, however they usually only set out the applicant’s claim in a short 
paragraph, and then proceed to reject the claim based on reasons to the effect that 
the applicant could not establish a well-founded fear of persecution. This 
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conclusion is often reached after a recitation in a single paragraph that the 
conditions in their country of origin have improved.  Furthermore, one often finds 
these decisions full of errors of law, such as the RSDO stating that the applicant 
cannot prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ that he or she will experience 
persecution,
147
 or statements that indicate that the RSDO clearly did not take into 
consideration the applicant's claim. The lack of sufficient and continuous training 
of Department of Home Affairs RSDOs, as well as lack of adequate resources to 
conduct country of origin research, undoubtedly accounts for the poor quality of 
these decisions.  
In light of the above situation, it is therefore necessary to examine the decisions of 
the Refugee Appeal Board, which are generally lengthier, more detailed decisions, 
and which are inclusive of a more thorough review of the appellant's refugee claim, 
up-to date country of origin information and international jurisprudence, used to 
accept or reject an appellant's claim.   Interestingly as well, the Refugee Appeal 
Board has itself on numerous occasions acknowledged the poor quality of the 
RSDOs' decisions, such that rather than conducting an appeal in the true sense,
148
 
the Refugee Appeal Board deems its hearings to be de novo hearings in which the 
Board in effect conducts a fresh refugee status determination hearing with the 
appellant.
149
   
Unfortunately, to date, the Refugee Appeal Board has officially made public only 
two of its decisions,
150
 which makes it very difficult to properly ascertain or 
determine its jurisprudence.   This is despite the good intentions of the Board to 
make more of its decisions widely available. However, with currently only four 
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members sitting on the Board, and a backlog of approximately 20,000 cases,
151
 not 
including the fully booked appeal hearings scheduled through to the beginning of 
2009, this is unfortunately unlikely to be a priority for the Board at this time.   The 
inability of the researcher to obtain the desired amount of Appeal Board decisions 
to review for this research, despite her numerous requests of the Chairperson of the 
Refugee Appeal Board for same, also confirms the extent of the Board's immense 
amount of work.  As a result of the lack of publicly available decisions, and/or 
accompanying statistics of the Refugee Appeal Board, similar to the constraints in 
analyzing first instance refugee status determination decisions, it is very difficult to 
precisely establish the manner in which the Board applies the OAU or section 3(b) 
refugee definition.   
Fortunately, despite the dearth of appeal decisions made available to her at this 
time, the researcher, through her many interactions with the Refugee Appeal Board 
in the course of her employment as a Refugee Legal Counsellor, has been able to 
pose questions of the Appeal Board members in an attempt to better understand its 
interpretation of the OAU definition.  In terms of the scope of application of the 
Refugees Act section 3(b), in other words whether the OAU definition applies to 
every person or only to every African, the Chairperson of the Refugee Appeal 
Board responded to the researcher’s question as follows:  
'...[T]he Board would apply [Section 3(b) of the Refugees 
Act] to anyone from any part of the world and not only 
Africans. The reasons here fore is that when the OAU 
Convention was incorporated into the Refugees Act, it did 
not specify that it would only apply to the African continent 
but was left open so to speak.'
152
  
In terms of the whether the IFA or Internal Flight Alternative may be applied to a 
person who takes flight as a result of a section 3(b) event, the Chairperson of the 
Appeal Board, on behalf of the Board, advised
153
 that the Board is not wholly in 
agreement with the position taken by UNHCR or Hathaway, being that the IFA 
does not apply as the definition clearly states that the event need only take place in 
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either part of the whole [of an applicant's] country of origin or nationality.   In this 
regard, the Board  is of the opinion that, if possible, an asylum seeker needs to have 
exhausted all internal remedies in his or her country of origin, prior to seeking 
protection abroad.  This is in line with the notion of surrogate protection, in which 
the international community is only required by law to provide asylum when a 
person's government is unable to do so itself.   In this regard, for example, it would 
not be possible or reasonable for a forced migrant from an event seriously 
disturbing the public order in Goma, in the eastern part of the DRC, to be required 
to travel to the very far-away capital city of Kinshasa, whereas fleeing across the 
border into a neighbouring country is safer and more practical.  However, if 
internal flight from a location in which an OAU event took place to one in which 
there is safety within the country is possible and not unduly difficult for the 
individual, then the Board feels that the IFA issue may be raised.   
Lastly, with regard to the issue of a whether or not a person may become a sur 
place refugee according to the OAU refugee definition, the Chairperson of the 
Refugee Appeal Board advised the researcher of the following: 
'..the OAU Convention or section 3(b) of the Refugees Act, 
1998, cannot apply to a sur place case because of the 
wording of the definition or section i.e. you must be 
compelled to leave your habitual place of residence...If you 
were not compelled to leave then it cannot apply.  
However, looking at the wording of section 2 of the 
Refugees Act, 1998, read with section 3 of the Act, it is 
clear that a person [fearing a section 3(b) or OAU event] 
must be granted asylum sur place.'
154
 
(v) Some Refugee Appeal Board decisions reviewed 
According to section 26(1) of the Refugees Act, 'any asylum seeker may lodge an 
appeal with the Appeal Board...if the Refugee Status Determination Officer has 
rejected the application in terms of section 2(3)(c),'
155
 in other words, if the RSDO 
has rejected the application as unfounded.   This automatic right to an appeal 
effectively means another layer added to the refugee determination procedure, 
since, as per the researcher's experience, it is more often than not the case that 
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rejected asylum seekers heavily rely on the appeal process for a proper decision on 
their claim and/or merely to prolong their stay in the country.  The immense 
number of appeal cases already heard by the Appeal Board for which decisions are 
still pending and those which are scheduled to take place in the future, which 
currently run well into 2009, is symptomatic of this situation.   
In light of the above, and the previously mentioned fact that the first instance 
decisions of the RSDOs still tend to be of relatively poor quality, it is concluded 
that an examination of the Appeal Board's application of the OAU definition is 
necessary to better ascertain South Africa's treatment of the extended refugee 
definition.  Furthermore, as there exists no jurisprudence from South African courts 
considering the definition of section 3(b) of the Refugees Act, one is required to 
rely on the interpretations of the Appeal Board at this time.  
As stated above, the researcher was unfortunately only able to obtain a handful of 
appeal decisions from the Refugee Appeal Board for the purposes of this study.  In 
fact, the Chairperson of the Appeal Board provided the researcher with 
approximately one hundred random appeal decisions, of which only eight decisions 
dealt with the section 3(b) refugee definition.  Despite the small sample, the mere 
fact that only such a small percentage of appeal board decisions raise the section 
3(b) definition may indicate that most of the claims that fall within the ambit of 
section 3(b) are in fact properly adjudicated at first instance.  Irrespective, an 
evaluation of the decisions obtained provides a picture of the Appeal Board 
applying the definition sensibly, yet at the same time rather cautiously.  
Of the Appeal Board decisions obtained by the researcher, five of them dealt with 
the general application of the section 3(b) definition.  In this regard, rather than 
analyzing a particular element of the definition itself, these decisions reviewed the 
appellant’s claim, then reviewed the conditions in the appellant’s country of origin 
and finally, concluded, based on the situation in the appellant’s country of origin, 
whether or not the asylum seeker qualified for refugee status in terms of this 
definition.  In terms of these decisions, especially those in which the Appeal Board 
upheld the appeal and granted refugee status based on the application of section 
3(b), the question remains as to why the Refugee Status Determination Officer at 




reach the conclusion that the asylum seeker must receive refugee protection.  
Unfortunately, due to the fact that the Refugee Appeal Board deems its hearings to 
be de novo ones, it is not possible when reviewing the Board's decision to assess the 
reasoning of the Refugee Status Determination Officer in coming to his or her 
negative decision at first instance for the same applicant.  The researcher, however, 
on a number of occasions, has been advised by Department of Home Affairs 
officials, of the lack of sufficient internet facilities, hence country of origin research 
capabilities, of its Refugee Status Determination Officers. This explanation may 
account for the incorrect application of the OAU definition at first instance as 
officials are unable to properly assess the situation in the applicant’s country of 
origin.  
  
In Refugee Appeal Board decision number 159/2004
156
, the Appeal Board granted 
refugee status to a Somali national hailing from the country’s war-ravaged capital 
city of Mogadishu, the appellant’s place of habitual residence.  The appellant’s 
claim consisted of his fleeing Mogadishu due to generalized life-threatening 
factional clan fighting which was occurring throughout the city.  In its decision, the 
Appeal Board referred to various 2003 country reports, which confirm the large 
number of civilian deaths in the city due to the continued fighting in the capital city.  
Interestingly, in this case, counsel for the appellant argued that her client should be 
granted refugee status based on an individualized or 1951 refugee claim and also 
argued that the appellant did not have an Internal Flight Alternative as he could not 
flee to ‘the northern part of the Somalia because he is from a different clan and will 
not be accepted there.’
157
  In this regard, the Appeal Board pointed out that counsel 
erred as:  
 
‘…its reasons for not returning the appellant to his 
country of origin falls within the ambit of section 3(b) of 
the Refugees Act, 1998, and not as prayed for by Counsel 
in terms of section 3(a) of the Act.  Section 3(a) makes it 
clear that a person must have a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for a specific reason mentioned in the 
section.  This is not the case with section 3(b) where a 
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person is compelled to leave his or her place of habitual 
residence because of, for instance, events seriously 
disturbing or disrupting public order and where 
persecution as such is not necessarily present. In this 
case, the appellant was compelled to leave Somalia 
because of the faction and clan fighting, in other words 
events seriously disturbing and/or disrupting public 




In another Appeal Board decision of a Somali national that was reviewed by the 
researcher the Appeal Board granted refugee status to the appellant who hailed from 
the southern Somali city of Kismayo.  Similar to the above decision, according to 
this appellant’s personal background it emerged that ‘nothing has ever happened to 
him personally and that his complaint is based on the ongoing clan-related fighting 
taking place in Kismayo and elsewhere in Somalia.’
159
  After reviewing the 
appellant’s claim, the Appeal Board went on to review a prominent country report 
on the situation in Somalia, which confirmed that the entire southern part of the 
country remains unstable due to chronic lawlessness and insecurity, hence ‘…[i]t is 
clear that anyone coming from the southern Somalia, such as Kismayo, whether 
anything has happened to them or not, fall within the group of asylum seekers 
needing international protection.’
160
   
 
According to the sample of decisions reviewed, it is evident that the Refugee 
Appeal Board also dismisses appeals on the basis of an analysis of the current 
conditions of the appellant’s country of origin.  In this regard, the Appeal Board 
uses documentary evidence or country reports to indicate that a change in country 
of origin conditions has taken place such that it is now, based on a forward looking 
definition of a refugee, considered safe for the asylum seeker to return to his 
country of origin.   
 
It is trite law that the refugee definition is a forward looking one, meaning that 
when a decision maker assesses whether someone qualifies for refugee status, he or 
she must determine if the asylum seeker will face persecution upon return to their 
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country of origin.  The Michigan Guidelines on Well-Founded Fear
161
 expand on 
this point, but specifically with regard to the element of fear in the 1951 refugee 
definition: 
 
‘An understanding of “fear” as forward-looking 
expectation of risk is fully justified by one of the plain 
meanings of the [Refugee Convention’s] English text, 
and is confirmed by dominant interpretations of the 
equally authoritative French language text (“craignant 
avec raison”), which do not canvass subjective 
trepidation. This construction avoids the enormous 
practical risks inherent in attempting objectively to assess 
the feelings and emotions of an applicant. It is moreover 
consistent with the internal structure of the Convention, 
for example with the principle that refugee status ceases 
when the actual risk of being persecuted comes to an end, 
though not on the basis of an absence of trepidation (Art. 
1(C)5-6), and with the fact that the core duty of non-
refoulement applies where there is a genuine risk of 
being persecuted, with no account taken of whether a 




A similar approach, that of a forward looking assessment of risk, to refugee 
determination based on the OAU or section 3(b) refugee definition, also must take 
place when the RSDO or the Refugee Appeal Board is deciding upon an asylum 
seeker’s claim.  This position is also logically consistent with the cessation clause 
found in the Refugees Act, 1998 at section 5(1)(e), which provides that a person 
ceases to qualify for refugee status if ‘he or she can no longer continue to refuse to 
avail himself or herself of the protection of the country of his or her nationality 
because the circumstances in connection with which he or she has been recognized 
as a refugee have ceased to exist.’
163
  In light of this fact, the Appeal Board 
appropriately assesses the prospective risk of an appellant by evaluating the current 
conditions in his or her country of origin.   
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With the above in mind, an example of the Board’s forward looking assessment in 
terms of sections 3(b) and 5(1)(e) of the Refugees Act is found in Appeal Board 
decision number 4013/03, in which the Board dismissed the appellant’s claim.  In 
this case, which the Appeal Board heard in February 2004, the Rwandan national 
fled his country of origin when the genocide reached his village in 1994.  The 
appellant arrived in South Africa in 1995 and, by letter dated 10 September 1997, 
the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs declined to grant him refugee status.
164
  
Once again, it is unclear why this decision was taken by the Standing Committee at 
the time, and in this regard, the Appeal Board confirms that ‘because the appeal 
hearing is a de novo procedure, the appellant does not have to prove that the 
Standing Committee was wrong…[rather] the Board assesses the evidence given by 
the appellant and makes its own decision on the objective facts concerned.’
165
  In 
any event, in terms of its assessment of the appellant’s claim, the Appeal Board had 
‘no hesitation in finding that section 3(b) of the Refugees Act, 1998, applied to the 
appellant when he initially lodged his application for refugee status.’
166
  However, 
the Appeal Board’s decision to dismiss the claim was based on whether or not ‘the 
situation in Rwanda has changed to such an extent that it is safe for appellant to 
return there.’
167
  In this regard, and based on the Appeal Board’s review of 2004 
and 2005 Rwanda situation reports, the Board determined that it would be safe for 
the appellant to return to his country.   
 
The above decision brings an important issue to the fore, that being the implications 
of such an extensive delay in the decision-making process of the Department of 
Home Affairs and Refugee Appeal Board.  In the above case, the appellant arrived 
in South Africa in early 1995 and ten years later, his appeal to the Refugee Appeal 
Board was dismissed, based on a forward looking assessment of risk, essentially 
meaning that while the appellant had a genuine refugee-related reason for fleeing 
his country ten years ago, at present, however, according to the Appeal Board, he 
could safely return there due to the changed circumstances in his country of origin.  
Unfortunately, this approach fails to take into consideration the impact of section 
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5(2) of the Refugees Act.  This section states that cessation of refugee status based 
on section 5(1)(e) ‘does not apply to a refugee who is able to invoke compelling 
reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself or herself of 
the protection of the country of nationality.'   In the case of Mayongo v Refugee 
Appeal Board & Others
168
 the South African High Court in a judicial review 
application of an Appeal Board decision dismissing an appeal of an Angolan 
asylum seeker, dealt with this issue specifically and granted the applicant refugee 
status. The Court held that  
 
'According to the UNCHR handbook a person is a refugee 
as soon as he/she fulfils the criteria contained in the 
definition. That takes place before he/she applies for 
refugee status. Recognition of refugee status does not make 
the person a refugee but only declares that he/se is 
one....The RAB accepted that he was compelled to flee 
Angola. It follows that he was a refugee at the time.  When 
the RAB dealt with the appeal it did not consider the 
impact of sections 5(1)(e) and 5(2) because the applicant 
never officially obtained refugee status. In that respect it 
made a basic error of law.  It was in law compelled to 
determine whether the post-traumatic stress syndrome and 
major depressive disorder constituted a compelling reason 





With this Mayongo decision in mind, the Appeal Board's decision in the Rwandan 
national's case described above may also contain a similar basic error in law. The 
Board decided that the genocide in Rwanda fell within the meaning of a section 
3(b) event, in order words, an event that compelled the appellant to flee his or her 
country because it seriously disrupted or disturbed the public order.  In its decision, 
when reviewing the appellant's claim, the Appeal Board simply stated that the 
appellant was a Tutsi, who was forced to flee when the genocide reached his 
village.  The researcher suggests that when the appellant arrived in South Africa, in 
terms of both the OAU and the 1951 Convention definitions, he would have 
qualified for refugee status.  Not only does the genocide qualify as an OAU event, 
but because the appellant was a Tutsi, he was specifically persecuted due to his race 
or tribe, as contemplated in the 1951 Convention definition.  The ten year delay in 
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finalizing this asylum seeker's claim, led to the Appeal Board dismissing his claim 
based on a lack of a forward looking assessment of risk, without taking into 
consideration possible circumstances of section 5(2) of the Refugee Act.  The 
Appeal Board having framed the reasons why the appellant fled his country to be a 
section 3(b) reason only, may have led to this possible error.      
 
Two further decisions of the Appeal Board examined by the researcher further 
highlight the significance of the forward looking assessment of risk as discussed 
above.  These Appeal decisions were both in regard to Burundian nationals.  The 
first of which, which was decided on 6 May 2004, found that the appellant, who 
fled his country in 1998, was a refugee because 'in the circumstances...the change(s) 
in Burundi have not been shown to be durable.'
170
  This decision was reached after 
the Board reviewed country of origin information which showed that despite a 
ceasefire in Burundi, fighting was still taking place in the country, hence a durable 
change of circumstances could not be established.  In this regard, the Appeal Board 
took into consideration Hathaway's following position on this point: 'This condition 
(durability) is in keeping with the forward-looking nature of the refugee definition 
and avoids the disruption of protection in circumstances where safety may be only a 
momentary aberration.'
171
   
 
Nearly three years later, however, in an Appeal Board decision dated 4 April 2007, 
the case of a Burundian appellant, who fled his country in 1997 when the civil war 
was rife in his country, was dismissed due to country of origin reports that indicated 
that 'the conditions in Burundi are changing for the better.'
172
 In this case, the Board 
found that 'there have been no serious recurrences of the widespread armed conflict 
or serious human rights abuses that were widely reported in 2004 and that section 
3(b) of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 is no longer applicable,'
173
 hence it was safe 
for appellant to return to his country at this time.  
   
The remaining Appeal Board decisions that the researcher reviewed relate to 
specific aspects of the section 3(b) refugee definition.  In this regard, the researcher 
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examined two Appeal Board decisions in which the phrase place of habitual 
residence was considered.  In Appeal Board decision number 378/05, the appeal 
was upheld and refugee status granted to a female national of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC).  The appellant was living and working in Uvira, and in 
September 2002 fled the generalized violence in that area, moving to Moba, another 
town in the DRC, where she remained for the next nine months.  When the fighting 
reached Moba, she fled the country, eventually arriving in South Africa.   She 
claimed she could not return to her country of origin, due to the ongoing fighting in 
the eastern part of the DRC.  In this case, the Board stated that the principle issue to 
be decided is whether the appellant was compelled to leave her place of habitual 
residence in order to seek refuge elsewhere, in other words whether section 3(b) of 
the Refugees Act was applicable.  In answering this question, the Board decided the 
following:  
 
'The last location where the appellant "resided" in the DRC 
was Moba where she had fled to after leaving Mulonge 
village in Uvira.  The Board has reservations whether Moba 
can be seen as the appellant's [place of] habitual residence 
and finds that it was not whether or not she was compelled 
to leave it.  The Board finds that Uvira was the appellant's 
place of habitual residence which she was compelled to 
leave in order to seek refuge elsewhere.  The appellant's 
evidence indicates that she was compelled to leave her 
place of habitual residence due to events seriously 
disturbing or disturbing public order i.e. the fighting taking 
place in the eastern DRC and specifically Uvira.'
174
   
The Board's above-interpretation relating to the appellant's place of habitual 
residence is, in essence, consistent with Rankin's comments relating to incidents of 
delay between the time when a refugee is compelled to leave his or her place of 
habitual residence due to an OAU event and the time he or she arrives in the 
country of asylum. During this period, an individual may be internally displaced 
and thus have to take up residence in various secondary locations before finally 
fleeing the country.  Whereas within the context of the 1951 refugee definition, a 
delay in taking flight may affect the asylum seeker's credibility
175
, in terms of the 
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OAU definition, a delay goes to the issue of whether someone has actually been 
compelled from their habitual residence.
176
  Rankin elaborates on this issue further 
as follows:  
'The short answer to the delay problem may be found in the 
concept of a continuing compulsion. That is the idea that 
having once fled from her place of habitual residence an 
asylum seeker will continue to be compelled so long as the 




In this same Appeal Board decision, the Board also confirms its cautious position 
taken with regard to the IFA, as described in the preceding section of this paper.  
More specifically, in this regard the Board states:  
'The final question which the Board has to consider is 
whether in cases where section 3(b) of the Act is 
application, the internal relocation alternative can be 
applied or not. In this instance Counsel for the appellant 
has argued that it cannot be applied.  The Board has certain 
reservations but for the purpose of this decision will go 
along with [Counsel's] argument. In the circumstances the 
appellant's appeal must succeed.'
178
 
In Refugee Appeal Board decision number 415/05, the Board again considered the 
issue of place of habitual residence when it dismissed the appellant's claim.  In this 
case, the appellant, a national from the DRC, was living in Lubumbashi, but was on 
a fishing trip with friends during school holidays in Moba. When appellant and his 
friends received news that rebels were coming, they attempted to return home to 
Lubumbashi but they encountered government troops in the town of Pweto. The 
soldiers accused the appellant and his friends of being rebels and then forced the 
appellant to fight with them against the rebels.  Shortly thereafter, the appellant was 
able to escape in an attack by the rebels on the army soldiers, and fled the country 
eventually arriving in South Africa. The appellant stated that when he fled, he was 
afraid to return to Lubumbashi because he would be accused of being a rebel and 
that furthermore he could not return to the DRC because of the war situation in the 
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eastern Congo.  The Board found that the Appellant 'did not habitually reside at 
Moba or at Pweto in the lower eastern part of the DRC'
179
 because he and his 
friends were there on vacation. The Board therefore concluded that ‘it is clear that 
section 3(b) of the Refugees Act, 1998, has no application here as the appellant, 
and his friends, were not compelled to leave their place of habitual residence to 
seek refuge elsewhere.'
180
  The Board furthermore decided that the appellant's 
assertion that he would be considered a rebel was implausible, and that 
Lubumbashi is under government control and according to country information is 
safe from fighting.  Accordingly, the appellant was denied refugee status. This 
decision demonstrates an appropriate analysis on the part of the Appeal Board 
regarding the application of the OAU refugee definition.  It furthermore reveals a 
situation in which the Appeal Board properly assesses an appellant's claim from the 
viewpoint of both the 1951 and the OAU refugee definitions.  
Lastly, the final Appeal Board decision obtained by the researcher for the purposes 
of this paper focuses on the Board's specific interpretation of the meaning of a 
disruption or disturbance of the public order.  In Refugee Appeal Board decision 
number 1433/06, the Appeal Board dismissed the appeal of a Nigerian asylum 
seeker based on its interpretation of this aspect of the 3(b) definition.  In this case, 
the appellant claimed that, as a Christian, he was fearful of the fighting taking place 
in his country between Christians and Muslims, although 'he was unable to state 
exactly where the fighting was taking place.'
181
  In its decision, the Board reviewed 
country of origin information on Nigeria, which confirmed that 'there were 
incidents of violence between Muslims and Christians between 2001 and 2004 
mainly in the Plateau and Kano states...[and] in reaction to the religious violence, 
President Obassanjo declared a state of emergency.'
182
  Furthermore, another report 
confirmed that as a result of violent incidents between Christians and Muslims 
during February 2006 in the city of Onitsha, from where the appellant hailed, the 
'state governor deployed 2000 policemen on the streets and appealed for calm.'  
According to these reports, the Board concluded that 'the government [of Nigeria] 
is taking an active role in preventing and/or stopping the violent incidents between 
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 and that the 'government is doing all it can to prevent or 
control violent incidents between the two religious groups.'  In turning to the 
application of section 3(b) of the Refugees Act, the Board concluded that the 
definition does not apply in this case, as events disrupting or disturbing the public 
order implies 'that the government is no longer in control,'
184
 which according to 
the Board, 'is not the case in Nigeria at all, [since] the government is firmly in 
control.'
185
   
This interpretation of the Appeal Board of events seriously disturbing or disrupting 
public order is seemingly a narrow one.  A government's attempts, no matter how 
genuine, to suppress or subdue serious disruptions or disturbances of public order 
should not be the litmus test for the application of this definition, since generalized 
violence and massive human rights violations may nonetheless take place, thereby 
compelling someone to take flight.  The effectiveness of a government's attempts 
must therefore be considered as well.  While the above case involved a clearly 
weak refugee claim, in that the appellant could not even point to specific events 
that compelled him to take flight, the Board in this decision nevertheless 
demonstrated a restrictive analysis, as nowhere did it question the ability of the 
Nigerian government to control the unrest that had occurred.  The following 
decision of the Appeal Board reviewed by the researcher is, however, more 
instructive on this point.  
In the course of her employment, the researcher has come across only one other 
Appeal Board decision, which provides further insight into the Board's 
interpretation of section 3(b) of the Refugees Act, and which complements the 
above decision.  In Refugee Appeal Board decision number 729/06, in which the 
Board dismissed the appeal of a Burundian asylum seeker, the Board stated the 
following: 
'Where law and order has broken and the government is 
unwilling or unable to protect its citizens, it can be said that 
there are events seriously disturbing or disrupting public 
order. To determine when a disturbance had taken place 
involves weighing the degree and intensity of the conduct 
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complained of against the degree and nature of the peace 
which can be expected to prevail in a given place at a given 
time. The test should be objective.'
186
  
This quote provides some clarity as to the Board's interpretation of events seriously 
disrupting public order as here the Appeal Board refers to the necessary ability of a 
government to protect its citizens in the face of an OAU or section 3(b) event.  
Accordingly, it can be stated that the Board takes the position that only when an 
asylum seeker's government is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens in the face 
of law and order having broken down, does this constitute a section 3(b) event.  
What is unclear or undefined, however, is the precise meaning of 'law and order 
breaking down.'   
V: The Case of Displaced Zimbabweans – Applying the OAU definition in 
order to provide the necessary protection? 
The recent mass exodus of migrants from Zimbabwe has been the recent focus of 
much media and public interest in South Africa.  According to various reports, 
there are as many as three million Zimbabweans in South Africa seeking work and 
asylum.
187
 Furthermore, from the researcher's experience, the number of 
Zimbabweans seeking asylum in South Africa has increased dramatically over the 
past three years.  The most significant observation with regard to this issue, 
however, is the fact that the Department of Home Affairs is denying that the 
Zimbabweans streaming into South Africa can be classified as refugees because 
they are not facing persecution in their home country, and that the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees concurs, saying that there is no crisis.
188
  In this regard, 
the researcher has personally interviewed a number of Zimbabwean nationals who 
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have either obtained refugee status in South Africa or are seeking it due to prima 
facie claims of persecution due to their political opinion, wither genuine or imputed 
to them.  It therefore cannot be stated that all Zimbabweans are not facing 
persecution in their country, especially in light of the concurrent reports confirming 




The fact is that there are many Zimbabweans who do qualify for refugee status 
based on the 1951 Convention definition; however, indeed the majority of 
Zimbabweans in South Africa may not necessarily qualify for refugee status based 
on the individualized refugee definition, as they are simply fleeing their country 
due to the grave, indiscriminate situation occurring there at this time.  There is no 
denying that Zimbabwe is a country in the middle of an economic crisis that has 
resulted in chronic shortages of food, fuel and foreign currency as well as record 
inflation and unemployment. That this is a humanitarian crisis is not a question. 
Whether it is a situation that can be characterized as events seriously disturbing 
public order for the purposes of the section 3(b) refugee definition is another 
matter.  Noticeably, in the South African government and UNHCR statement 
referred to above, there is no mention whatsoever of the possibility that these 
Zimbabweans may qualify for refugee status in terms of the OAU refugee 
definition.   
As stated, the mass departure from Zimbabwe has taken place during a time which 
has seen in that country an increase in political repression, resulting in severe 
violations of civil and political rights, such as arbitrary arrests, detentions and 
brutality against opposition political members.  Still, economic and social rights 
have also been violated in Zimbabwe to a mass degree, including large-scale forced 
evictions
190
, the politicization of food aid
191
 and an economy that has practically 
                                               
189 See ‘Zimbabwe: Opposition Activists Teargassed, Beaten’ (23 January 2008) accessed on 28 
January 2008 at http://allafrica.com/stories/200801230905.html, and ‘Opposition leader: 
Zimbabwean aide beaten’ (18 March 2007) accessed on 28 January 2008 at 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/africa/03/18/zimbabwe.arrests/index.html, and ‘Zimbabwe 




 For example, the Zimbabwe government’s 2005 Operation Murambatsvina (“drive out trash”) in 




collapsed as a result of the government’s economic policies.
192
  In this regard, the 
question that the researcher is asking in this part of the paper is whether an 
economic meltdown at the hands of government can qualify as an OAU or section 
3(b) event, when the end result is massive violations of the local population's 
economic and social rights. 
The aforementioned Department of Home Affairs press statement and the 
consistent denial of refugee status by Refugee Status Determination Officers at first 
instance to those Zimbabwean asylum seekers who clearly do not have 
individualized claims of persecution
193
 may be indicative of the government’s 
position on this point.  Furthermore, the South African government’s reported high 
levels of mass deportation of Zimbabweans
194
 supports the position that, according 
to South African officials, Zimbabweans are merely economic migrants, who do 
not deserve refugee protection.  This position is particularly worrisome as the South 
African government is failing to assess whether the 'economic reasons' of these 
migrants for leaving their country are possibly the  result of a loss of public order in 
Zimbabwe or whether these reasons may amount to economic and social rights 
violations that constitute persecution or result in a risk to their life.   
The only way in which the OAU Convention's expanded refugee definition could 
apply to these Zimbabwean migrants is if the current situation in that country can 
be qualified as equalling that of events seriously disturbing or disrupting the public 
order.  Due to the political implications of such a decision, in other words, the 
prospect of the floodgates literally opening up, it is highly unlikely that the 
government of South Africa will ever consider the situation in Zimbabwe to qualify 
                                                                                                                                   
homeless victims of forced evictions in Zimbabwe’ (20 June 2005) accessed on 28 January 2008 at 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/zimbabwe_27463.html 
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 See Human Rights Watch report ‘Zimbabwe: Food Used as Political Weapon’ (24 October 2003) 
accessed on 28 January 2008 at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/10/24/zimbab6477.htm 
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 Zimbabwe’s inflation rate has been estimated at over 8,000%, the world’s highest. See BBC 
News Article Zimbabwe inflation “incalculable”’ (27 November 2007) accessed on 28 January 2008 
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7115651.stm 
193 This assertion is made resulting from observations of the researcher.  The Department of Home 
Affairs is seemingly treating most Zimbabweans in South Africa as economic migrants. As such, 
many refugee claims of Zimbabwean nationals are being rejected as manifestly unfounded. 
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as such.  This is despite the fact that, as seen above, the exact meaning of the term 
public order is unclear.  In this regard, this paper has shown that the term may refer 
to an undermining of the peace or tranquillity of society, as a result of sufficiently 
wide-scale violations of human rights, which are not specifically settled as only 
being civil and political rights.   Furthermore, in line with the above-noted position 
that the category of events seriously disturbing public order may include all man-
made events, the government-caused widespread economic deprivation affecting a 
significant percentage of the Zimbabwean population can indeed be considered as 
such an event.  Clearly, such an event or situation is not akin to a natural disaster 
such as a flood or drought, which produces 'sources of vulnerability beyond social 




When initially approaching the Refugee Appeal Board for section 3(b) decisions to 
use for this research, the researcher specifically requested the Board for cases 
involving Zimbabwean nationals.  In this regard, the researcher wanted to 
understand the Board’s position on this sensitive issue.  Unfortunately, no Appeal 
Board decisions involving Zimbabwean nationals were made available for this 
purpose.  Nevertheless, according to the decisions reviewed above, it appears as 
though the Refugee Appeal Board would also not construe the grave economic 
situation in Zimbabwe as events disrupting or disturbing the public order, as 
according to the Board this terms implies that the government is no longer in 
control.  The Appeal Board would likely argue that the Zimbabwe government is in 
control, albeit doing dreadfully in terms of its economic policies.  In this regard, the 
Board similarly confirmed
196
 that Operation Murambatsvina could not be 
considered an event seriously disturbing public order because it was an act 
undertaken by a government that was purportedly in control; hence it had the 
authority to undertake same.   
Furthermore, the Appeal Board, in decision number 729/06, stated that when law 
and order has broken down in a country and the government is unable to unwilling 
to protect its citizens in the face of same, then such circumstances constitute a 
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 In a discussion with the Chairperson of the Refugee Appeal Board on or about 30 July 2007 




section 3(b) event.  Unfortunately, as stated above, the Appeal Board did not 
describe or give meaning to the term law and order.  In any event, if the Board 
decides that the actions of the Zimbabwean government are taken within its 
authority to do so, then the Board may assert that nothing indicates that the 
Zimbabwean government is unwilling to protect its citizens.  It can be argued, 
however, that if the actions of the Zimbabwean government have created an 
arguably life threatening situation, then the state has failed in its basic duty to 
protect its citizens and the state is unable to protect its citizens, hence a claim for 
refugee protection is in order.  Alternatively, if the Zimbabwean government's 
actions are deliberately aimed at depriving a specific social group 
disproportionately, then an argument can be made for refugee protection in terms of 
the 1951 Convention definition.  
In the opinion of the researcher, due to the government-induced collapse of the 
Zimbabwean economy and the consequent wide scale social and economic rights 
violations in Zimbabwe, there is a case to be made for the inclusion of the displaced 
Zimbabweans as refugees in terms of the OAU refugee definition.  In this regard, 
the economic collapse may be viewed as the event disturbing or disrupting the 
public order, with its effects being mass violations of human rights. Regrettably, 
the researcher could not locate precedents from elsewhere in Africa to support this 
type of inclusion.  In any event, this is no more than an academic argument, as the 
political implications of taking such a position are not fathomable for the South 
African government at this time.  With this in mind, and in light of the continuing 
humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe, there is still the need for a temporary solution to 
the challenges presented by the large number of Zimbabwean migrants in South 
Africa.  F Khan, the Coordinator of the Refugee Rights Project at the University of 
Cape Town Law Clinic, examined this issue and concluded as follows:  
'South Africa's very recent inclination to provide a special 
temporary residence permit to Zimbabweans (one that will 
legalize their stay for a short period of time and allow them 
to work in the interim) will hopefully fill the gap in South 
Africa's law....[S]uch a permit would not only promote the 
legal entry of Zimbabweans into South Africa at a port of 
entry, but at the same time it will serve a much greater 




who are facing a humanitarian crisis which will ensure that 




In light of the continuing trend that has seen the narrowing of the scope of 
application of the 1951 Convention definition, resulting in the denial of protection 
to people who require safety for their lives outside of their country of origin or 
nationality, the expanded OAU refugee definition represents an ‘opposite trend 
[and] is what comprises its true value for refugee jurisprudence at a global level.’
198
  
Whether or not in the South African context this is the case has been the focus of 
this research paper.  The above case study of the mass numbers of Zimbabwean 
forced migrants in South Africa is evidence of a missed opportunity that South 
Africa has to extend refugee protection to a clearly vulnerable group of persons.  It 
is assumed, however, that the South African government is unwilling at this time to 
go as far as to take such a decision, given the far-reaching implications it may have.    
Acknowledging the contention that qualifying Zimbabwe's government-induced 
collapse of the economy as an OAU event may be an overly inclusive extension of 
the OAU refugee definition, the question remains whether South Africa is applying 
the expanded refugee definition sensibly and judiciously, and as such providing 
international protection to those forced migrants who may otherwise not qualify for 
refugee status in terms of the 1951 Convention definition.  This research indicates 
that the answer to this question is a particularly difficult one.  At the outset, 
assessing whether the definition is properly applied is critically hampered by the 
fact that the precise legal meaning of the OAU refugee definition is non-existent, 
and that comparative jurisprudence from other jurisdictions on the continent is not 
readily available.  
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Turning to South Africa's asylum determination procedure, one can conclude that, 
at first instance, the Department of Home Affairs' reliance on the OAU refugee 
definition in the form of a prima facie procedure based on white lists or refugee 
generating countries is an inadequate approach, in that it may include generalized 
and hence incorrect assumptions about what constitutes an OAU or section 3(b) 
event and a lack of appropriate consideration of the other elements of the definition.  
Additionally, as there is currently no mass influx situation in the country, such 
group determination violates the Refugees Act, which clearly provides for an 
individualised refugee status determination for each applicant.  In examining only 
the objective conditions of a country, the RSDOs may also potentially disregard the 
subjective elements of an individual applicant's claim.  In this regard, as van Beek 
states, 'a [refugee] determination procedure, which is only based on country 
information, neglects the fact that refugees also come from countries perceived to 
be safe...[and] violates the principle of non-discrimination, written down in the 
South African Constitution and the UN and OAU Conventions.'
199
 
With regard to South Africa's Refugee Appeal Board decisions, a more considered 
and measured approach to the application of the OAU or section 3(b) refugee 
definition has been observed.  From the limited number of decisions reviewed, it 
appears as though the Appeal Board is faithfully applying its mind to the numerous 
interpretative issues raised by the OAU refugee definition, and that the Board's 
application of the expanded refugee definition is reasoned, although fairly limited 
or narrow in its scope.  However, it may not be until such time as an Appeal 
Board's decisions involving its interpretation of the expanded refugee definition is 
challenged on judicial review to the High Court that more meaningful 
jurisprudence will develop in this regard.   
In addition to reviewing the government's application of the OAU refugee 
definition in its asylum process in order to determine whether appropriate protection 
is being provided for, it is also relevant to examine whether or not the South 
African government is upholding the other key requirements of the OAU 
Convention.  This is in order to determine whether, overall, South Africa is abiding 
by its legal obligations under the OAU Convention.  In this regard, Article 2(1) the 
                                               




OAU Convention provides that member states shall 'use their best endeavours, 
consistent with their respective legislation, to receive refugees and to secure the 
settlement of those refugees who for well-founded reasons are unable or unwilling 
to return to their country of origin.'
200
  Sub-article (4) of Article 2 additionally sets 
out the concept of burden-sharing amongst member states, in that if a member state 
finds ‘difficulty in continuing to grant asylum to refugees, such state may appeal 
directly to other member states and through the OAU and such member states shall 
in the spirit of African solidarity and international cooperation take appropriate 
measures to lighten the burden of the member state granting asylum.’
201
    
 
In terms of these provisions, especially that of burden sharing, it is significant to 
note the following statistics regarding the relative numbers of refugees and asylum 
seekers in South Africa as compared to other much poorer and less developed 
African nations.  While Africa contains approximately one quarter of the world’s 
total refugee population,
202
 South Africa only provides refuge to a relatively small 
percentage of the continent’s total number.  At the end of 2006, South Africa had 
35,086 recognized refugees and a total of 131,107 pending asylum seeker 
applications.
203
  Even though in 2007 South Africa received more asylum seekers 
than any other country, with 53,400 new asylum claims lodged,
204
 the total number 
of persons protected in South Africa still remains relatively low.  In contrast, at the 
end of 2006, Tanzania was providing protection to 485,295 refugees; Uganda was 
protecting 272,007 refugees and Kenya accommodating 272,531 refugees.
205
  These 
numbers, juxtaposed to the Department of Home Affairs’ convictions that it is 
dealing with an overwhelming mass influx of asylum seekers, indicates an off-
putting attitude of the South African government towards refugee protection, 
especially relative to other African countries.  In addition, the ever-worsening 
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conditions at the Department of Home Affairs Refugee Reception Offices
206
, 
including the frequently reported xenophobic attitudes of Home Affairs officials 
towards refugees and asylum seekers, indicates that 'best endeavours, consistent 
with their respective legislation, to receive refugees' are not necessarily being made. 
 
Article 2(3) of the OAU Convention specifically prohibits the refoulement of 
refugees. It provides that ‘no person shall be subjected by a Member State to 
measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would compel 
him to return or remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty 
would be threatened for the reasons set out in Article 1, paragraphs 1 and 2.’  This 
Article ‘goes much farther than the comparable provision in the 1951 
Convention,’
207
 in that it ‘expressly prohibits, and thereby includes within the scope 
of its non-refoulement principle, rejection at the border.’
208
  This is another 
provision of the OAU Convention, which arguably the South African government is 
not wholly abiding by.  According to J van Garderen of the Lawyers for Human 
Rights, in fact 'South Africa is following an exclusion policy, the outcome of which 
may inflate refugee numbers in other countries, in spite of her own comparatively 
small refugee population.'
209
  In this regard, South African refugee practice 'appears 
to hinge around the prevention of refugees from entering the country failing which 
everything possible should be done to ensure their exit.'   More specifically, many 
reports confirm the extent to which South Africa deports migrants, many of which 
never get the opportunity to reach a refugee reception office to apply for asylum 
and hence may be subject to re-foulement to their countries of origin at the hands of 
South African officials.  Such 'foreign migrants are liable to be arrested, detained, 
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Given the above, this research concludes that, by and large, the South African 
government is a long way away from being able to claim adherence to all of the key 
provisions of the OAU Refugee Convention.  In terms of its application of the OAU 
Convention's refugee definition, it would appear that Department of Home Affairs 
officials are not sufficiently trained to apply the definition properly and that the 
asylum process itself, given the significant pressures it faces, does not allow for this 
to take place.  Specific training on the non-exclusive application of the section 3(b) 
refugee definition should be provided, as well as a concerted effort to promote the 
expansion of the concept of refugee protection to all persons who do not have 
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